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The Effects of Government Interventions 
in the Financial Sector  
on Banking Competition  
and the Evolution of Zombie Banks 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We investigate how government interventions such as blanket guarantees, liquidity 
support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations affect banking competition. This issue is 
critical for stability, access to finance, and economic growth. Exploiting cross-country and 
cross-time variation in the timing of interventions and accounting for their non-
randomness, we document that liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations 
trigger large increases in competition. We also find some more nuanced evidence that 
zombie banks’ market shares in crisis countries evolve together with interventions.  A 
higher frequency of interventions coincides with greater zombie bank presence, and 
increases in competition are larger when zombie banks occupy bigger market shares.  
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“Rescuing large banks may have averted the immediate crisis, but it also provided these  
banks a competitive advantage, […] potentially destabilizing the financial system.” 
Final Report of the Congressional Oversight Panel (16th March 2011, p. 189) 
 
 “the measures [… ] ensure a sustainable future for Lloyds without  
continued state support and that there will not be undue distortions of competition.” 
European Commission - Press Release IP/09/1728 (18th November 2009) 
I. Introduction 
Banking systems have been profoundly reshaped by crises and the concomitant policy 
responses. In recent years, governments and other authorities designated with banking 
regulation and supervision issued blanket guarantees, extended liquidity support, injected 
capital, and nationalized banks on an unprecedented scale (Hoshi and Kashyap (2010); 
Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012); Duchin and Sosyura (2014)). Such government 
interventions affect large numbers of institutions because these interventions send strong 
signals to all banks in the market, and make them anticipate future bailouts. This distorts 
their incentives with potential implications for competition (Acharya and Yorulmazer 
(2007)). Moreover, interventions can undermine the Schumpeterian process of creative 
destruction. Weak banks may not exit the market and evolve as unviable zombie banks, i.e. 
banks that have an economic net worth below zero but continue to operate and remain 
able to repay debt because of government support. In turn, these zombie banks may crowd 
out their healthy competitors (Claessens (2009a)).  
In this paper, we contribute to the debate about the unintended effects of government 
aid for the banking sector using a large dataset for 124 countries, 41 of them experienced 
banking crises between 1996 and 2010. While the recent crisis has shown that 
interventions can have stabilizing effects, we ask what the effects are of blanket guarantees, 
liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on banking competition during 
crises. We also investigate how these interventions correlate with the evolution of zombie 
banks, and our final tests document how interventions and zombie banks affect deposit and 
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loan rates. Although the literature started examining the effects of interventions on risk-
taking at the bank level and distinguishes between the behavior of rescued banks and their 
competitors, no effort has been devoted to the effects on competition for the entire 
industry, despite the relevance for policy and regulation. Therefore, we perform our tests 
on the aggregate level of the banking system, i.e., on the country level, to take the signalling 
effects for all banks into account.   
A common feature that connects the four interventions we study is that they supplant 
market discipline on the liability side and constitute a source of moral hazard on the asset 
side of banks’ balance sheet. Since theoretical work and empirical evidence offer so far no 
insight into the effect of government interventions on competition on the banking system 
level, we turn to several studies on the bank level, and the literature on the interaction 
between non-financial firms’ leverage and product-market dynamics to obtain some 
indications for the effects of interest.  
Focusing on blanket guarantees for individual banks, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) and 
Acharya and Kulkarni (2013) show that blanket guarantees equip banks with competitive 
advantages in funding markets. Similarly, Richardson and Troost (2009) argue that 
liquidity support increases distressed banks’ survival odds. Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
document that better capitalized banks also have higher survival odds during crises. 
Furthermore, they show that such banks expand market shares. On the other hand, 
Cordella and Yeyati (2003) predict that recapitalizations make banks less aggressive as 
capital support raises charter values. Moral hazard effects from guarantees are 
documented by Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler (2014). Similarly, Freixas (1999) highlights 
that central bank liquidity support creates moral hazard, and Duchin and Sosyura (2014) 
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discuss moral hazard implications of recapitalizations. The literature on the link between 
non-financial firms’ leverage and product-market dynamics offers conflicting views. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) predict firms with more debt prey on competitors, an argument 
which suggests that blanket guarantees increase competition. In contrast, Chevalier (1995) 
shows that less levered firms are more competitive. This suggests that recapitalizations 
and nationalizations should increase competition.  
Given these inconclusive predictions and the lack of evidence, empirical work is 
necessary to establish the effects of government interventions on banking competition. 
However, in the absence of a natural experiment, it is challenging to identify causal effects 
with cross-country data. Before employing difference-in-difference estimations, we 
therefore first demonstrate that interventions are orthogonal with respect to competition, 
measured by Lerner indices and net interest margins. Moreover, we also show that 
treatment and control group countries satisfy the parallel trends assumption.  
Our key results, unique in the literature, highlight large increases in competition from 
liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations. These effects tend to persist over 
time. We can rule out that compressed interest income during crises, and poor demand 
conditions drive our results. 
Disentangling reactions to banking crises from the responses to interventions is another 
challenge. Crises may trigger similar effects for the outcomes we study, and in most 
instances the onset of crises coincides with the announcement of interventions. While our 
data do not permit comparing crisis countries with and without interventions because 
crisis countries also experience interventions, we show that the competition-increasing 
effects remain in place when we omit countries with systemic crises and constrain 
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treatment to those which experience borderline (i.e., non-systemic) crises. We also observe 
increases in competition once we drop countries that witnessed the most intensive crises, 
and EU countries where rescues have been conditional on pro-competitive restructurings. 
In addition, we run falsification tests based on relaxations of banks’ activity restrictions and 
fake crises which also support our inferences.  
Moreover, it is also challenging to separate the effects of the four direct types of 
government interventions we study from macroeconomic conditions and macroeconomic 
policies adopted during crises that may also affect the outcomes of interest.  To alleviate 
such concerns, our regressions control for monetary policy conditions, governments’ 
ability to bail out banks, and changes in the exchange rate.  
The final challenge arises from the non-random assignment of interventions. 
Governments’ actions to deal with crises are not only likely to be endogenous to the depth 
of crises but we also only observe interventions when crises actually occur. We deal with 
the former problem using instrumental variables, described in detail below. The latter 
problem gives rise to a selection problem which we address with a Heckman (1979) 
procedure, also discussed more specifically below. These tests reinforce the findings 
obtained with the difference-in-difference estimator. 
What drives the shift towards more competition? Previous work suggests that 
government support suppresses the shakeout of unviable institutions, and these zombie 
banks prey on the healthy institutions’ market shares (Kane (1990)). We advance this 
research to examine if zombie banks crowd out their competitors. In tests that focus only 
on crisis countries to better gauge the time-series evolution of zombie banks, we show that 
liquidity support and recapitalizations are positively associated with zombie banks’ market 
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shares in deposit and loan markets when we rely on book values of equity to classify 
zombie banks. Recapitalizations and nationalizations are weakly positively associated with 
zombies’ market shares when we use a market based measure of zombie banks.  In 
addition, we show that large market shares held by zombie banks coincide with a greater 
frequency of interventions, and increases in competition tend to be greater when zombie 
banks are more prevalent.   
Our last set of tests closes the loop and sheds light onto the effects of government 
interventions on average deposit and loan rates. Liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations depress deposit rates, but a detailed investigation suggests that this 
finding is not causally attributable to government interventions but rather driven by large 
degrees of government ownership of the banking system. On the other hand, however, 
borrowers benefit from reduced loan rates as a consequence of these interventions, and 
this finding obtains even after omitting countries whose banking systems are characterized 
by high degrees of government ownership of banks. As part of the analysis of pricing 
effects, we are also able to find more support for the role of zombie banks for aggregate 
shifts in market conduct. The pricing effects are more pronounced in a subsample of 
countries that have at least one year of zombie bank presence.  
This research is important for three reasons. First, banking competition is assumed to be 
linked with financial stability, and this link dominates the policy debate and the 
architecture of regulatory frameworks (Claessens (2009b)). While it is beyond the scope of 
our study to examine effects of interventions on risk-taking, we stress that the risk-shifting 
effect arising from interventions for market discipline and moral hazard discussed in this 
literature also matters for our research. Typically, competition is seen as undesirable as it 
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incentivizes banks to take risk and increases the cost of government interventions. Second, 
banking competition affects availability of credit, access to finance, and, ultimately, 
economic growth (Claessens and Laeven (2005); Norden, Rosenboom, and Wang (2013)). 
To the extent that interventions affect banks’ supply of credit via competition as shown in 
Giannetti and Simonov (2013), the competitive effects will spill over into the real economy. 
Third, academics and policy makers not only voiced concerns that the rescue measures 
affect competition as reflected in the quotes above, but the European Commission made it a 
policy objective to limit competitive effects as they believe rescued banks gain market 
power over their peers (Claessens (2009a)). For instance, the European Commission 
(2009) made state aid conditional on restructuring plans for supported institutions. These 
conditions include, inter alia, divestments of subsidiaries, branch networks, and limits on 
deposit pricing. Such conditions have been introduced in a few cases.1 
Our research speaks to the literature on the design of bank bailouts. Aghion, Bolton, and 
Fries (1999) discuss closure rules and banks’ incentives, and Gorton and Huang (2004) 
propose that government interventions improve welfare when private parties cannot 
provide liquidity. This view of a ‘bright side’ of interventions is also supported by Dwyer 
and Hasan (2007) who show that suspending convertibility reduces the number of bank 
failures. In contrast, Diamond and Rajan (2005) illustrate a ‘dark side’ of bailouts because 
they may trigger increased demand for liquidity and additional bank insolvencies.   
We proceed as follows. Section II discusses the data, and Section III presents main 
results. Section IV examines the role of zombie banks. Section V documents pricing effects. 
Section VI concludes.   
                                                          
1  See press releases by the European Commission (Royal Bank of Scotland, IP/09/1915; Lloyds Banking Group, 
IP/09/1728).  
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II. Data and overview about policy responses to banking crises  
We use data for 124 countries, 41 of them experienced banking crises. The crisis data 
and the information about policy responses are obtained from Laeven and Valencia (2010, 
2013) for 1996-2010. Of those crises, 29 are systemic, and 12 are borderline crises.  A 
country is classified as having a systemic crisis if the banking system exhibited stress, 
reflected in significant runs, losses, and/or liquidations, and, additionally, if significant 
interventions can be observed. Countries that “almost met” the definition of a systemic 
crisis are classified as borderline crises. Interventions are considered significant if 3 of the 
following 6 events can be observed: (1) significant guarantees, (2) liquidity support (5% of 
deposits and liabilities to non-residents), (3) recapitalizations with public funds (exceeding 
3% of GDP), (4) significant nationalizations, (5) significant asset purchases, and (6) deposit 
freezes or bank holidays.  
Crises responses consist of an initial phase concerned with containing liquidity strain, 
protecting liabilities, and limiting fire sales. The containment phase triggers liquidity 
support, and guarantees on banks’ liabilities, and, less frequently, deposit freezes and bank 
holidays. Subsequently, balance sheet restructuring takes center stage: banks are resolved, 
recapitalized, and nationalized. While deposit freezes and bank holidays have no prediction 
as to how they affect competition, other policy responses translate into precise predictions. 
We constrain our study to blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations because the literature offers indications for how these interventions affect 
competition.2 Common to them is they provide signals to market participants about 
                                                          
2  Theoretically, all interventions can be seen as combinations of liquidity infusions and recapitalizations. Diamond and 
Rajan (2005) show that a central authority which taxes claimants on liquidity and lends it back to the system at 
interest rates below those that taxpayers would choose increases supply of liquidity. When such a loan is at the 
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governments’ commitment to rescue banks which raises expectations about future 
bailouts.3 Table A.1 in the Supplementary Appendix, available at the journal website 
(www.jfqa.org) presents details. 
Blanket guarantees. A common response to runs are blanket guarantees. They are 
defined as full protection of bank liabilities or instances in which non-deposit liabilities of 
banks are protected. Since runs destabilize payment systems, guarantees can restore 
confidence. Theory offers clear predictions for the effect of (asymmetric) guarantees. Kane 
and Klingebiel (2004) state that guarantees constitute credit enhancements which allow 
supported banks to obtain funds more cheaply. Subsequent work by Hakenes and Schnabel 
(2010) points out that guarantees not only affect protected banks but also their 
competitors. Guarantees reduce margins and charter values of the protected banks’ 
competitors which arises from aggressive competition from supported banks that 
refinance at subsidized rates. This makes competitors more aggressive; a prediction 
confirmed by Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011). Similarly, Acharya and Kulkarni 
(2013) show that guarantees yield competitive advantages for public sector banks in 
deposit markets, and Gropp, Gruendl, and Guettler (2014) show that guarantees supplant 
market discipline. They find removing guarantees curbs moral hazard. Work by Brander 
and Lewis (1995) examines the leverage of non-financial firms which is also relevant as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
market rate, this operation is a pure liquidity infusion. In contrast, if the central authority relies on taxation power and 
allocates a gift of future value to a particular bank, e.g., a claim on goods in the future, such an operation is a pure 
recapitalization. Gifts of current goods to banks represent liquidity infusions equal to the quantity of current goods 
plus a recapitalization equal to the future value of those goods, evaluated at market rates. 
3  Unlike interventions during the containment phase, interventions in the resolution phase are observed on the bank 
level. We focus on industry effects and therefore analyze recapitalizations and nationalizations on the aggregate level 
to capture signalling effects. Table A.2 in the Supplementary Appendix presents complementary bank level evidence. 
Using a hand-collected sample of 589 recapitalizations and 26 nationalizations, we confirm competition-increasing 
effects of recapitalizations and nationalizations (except for nationalizations on net interest margins). To strengthen 
identification, we run these tests with bank fixed effects, year fixed effects, and also include specifications with an 
interaction of country fixed and year fixed effects. These tests purge time-invariant bank specific heterogeneities and 
time-varying effects and also any unobserved time-varying effect on the country level we may have omitted in our 
main regressions on the system level. 
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blanket guarantees increase bank debt. They find that highly levered firms behave more 
aggressively in the market.   
Liquidity support also plays a role in containing crises.  We consider instances of liquidity 
support when the ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and 
foreign liabilities exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level. 
We also consider liquidity support from the Treasury. The premise is that extending loans 
to troubled banks is less costly than no intervention. Richardson and Troost (2009) show 
that monetary intervention can be effective because emergency lending raises distressed 
banks’ chance to survive. However, the increase in survival odds for supported banks 
provides them also with competitive advantages. Theoretical work in this area focuses on 
moral hazard. Freixas (1999) shows that the lender of last resort should not support all 
banks. However, when large banks (the too-big-to-fail phenomenon) or many banks (the 
too-many-to-fail phenomenon) are distressed, supporting the large bank or all distressed 
banks is the preferred action. Both the too-big-to-fail and the too-many-to-fail effect change 
incentives and give rise to moral hazard. 
Recapitalizations. A cornerstone during the resolution phase is the provision of capital 
support. We define recapitalizations as instances in which the cost of recapitalizing banks 
exceed 3 percent of GDP. Beyond the moral hazard effect from recapitalizations 
documented by Dam and Koetter (2012) and Duchin and Sosyura (2014), several studies 
describe the link between capital and competition which provides insights for our work. 
While Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011) predict that higher capital ratios enable banks to 
compete effectively for loans and deposits and increase market shares, Cordella and Yeyati 
(2003) argue that recapitalizations reduce banks’ propensity to compete because capital 
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injections increase charter values. Empirical work on capital structure yields conflicting 
results. On the one hand, Chevalier (1995) illustrates that less leverage increases non-
financial firms’ competitiveness. This result is confirmed by Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
who show that better capitalized banks have higher market shares. On the other hand, 
Lyandres (2006) shows that less levered non-financials compete less aggressively.  
Nationalizations are takeovers of systemically important financial institutions and 
extend only to cases where governments take majority ownership stakes. In some crises, all 
banks are nationalized. Studies on government ownership suggest that state ownership 
allows banks to lend at lower loan rates relative to privately owned banks (Sapienza 
(2004)). This effect is attributed to reduced funding costs from government support 
(Acharya and Kulkarni (2013)). In turn, market discipline is undermined, reducing banks’ 
monitoring incentives. This results also in moral hazard since nationalizations de facto 
guarantee bank debt. The predictions from the literature on non-financial firms discussed 
for recapitalizations also apply to nationalizations. 
All interventions are related via the effects on refinancing costs and moral hazard. Thus, 
we first establish the overall effect on competition using Lerner indices and net interest 
margins. Importantly, while the market discipline effect operates on the liability side of the 
balance sheet, the moral hazard effect operates on the asset side. Consequently, we also 
document pricing effects for deposits and loans. 
 III. Effects of government interventions on banking competition 
Various approaches exist to measure banking competition. We employ two alternative 
measures: the Lerner index, and the net interest margin. Both of them are widely used in 
the literature on banking competition (Claessens (2009b); Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk 
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(2012)). Since our tests are performed at the banking system level, we use the average 
Lerner index and the average net interest margin per country per year. We use 181,830 
bank-year observations for 21,988 banks in 124 countries, obtained from BankScope, to 
compute the two competition measures. Further details are shown in our Supplementary 
Appendix A.3. BankScope is the limiting factor for the sample period.  
The two measures of competition are complementary. The Lerner index captures 
market power by calculating the mark up of prices above marginal costs. This is important 
because Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2011) show that this is the main channel through 
which government subsidies affect banking competition. It includes non-interest income 
and non-interest costs, and consequently captures competition in broad activities. 
Moreover, the Lerner index has a solid theoretical foundation by relying on asset as well as 
funding information to capture the effect of pricing power on both the asset and funding 
side of the balance sheet (Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2014)). In contrast, the net 
interest margin, calculated as the difference between banks’ interest income and interest 
expenses and expressed in percent of earning assets, focuses on competition in traditional 
loan and deposit activities which dominate less developed banking systems. Since our data 
contain many emerging markets, relying on interest margins provides a sensitivity check. 
Unlike the Lerner index, the net interest margin can also easily be exploited to compute 
average loan and deposit rates which we study in Section V below. The two measures are 
not significantly correlated, the coefficient is -0.014. The average Lerner index is 0.25 and 
the average net interest margin is 0.06. These figures are comparable with previous work.    
The key explanatory variables are coded as binary variables and take the value of one in 
the year the intervention was announced and subsequently if a country is still affected by 
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the intervention (Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2012, 2013)). We register 11 blanket 
guarantees. The dummy for liquidity support takes on the value one if liquidity support by 
the central bank is at least 5% of deposits and liabilities to non-residents/GDP (34 
instances). Our dummy for recapitalizations is restricted to recapitalizations whose costs 
exceed 3% of GDP (32 instances). We code takeovers of systemically important banks and 
instances where the government takes a majority stake in banks’ equity capital as 
nationalizations (26 instances).   
A. Preliminary inspection    
In a preliminary inspection, we demonstrate for each country which announced blanket 
guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations the change in average 
Lerner indices and average net interest margins. Figure 1 also shows the corresponding 
change for the control group, defined as countries without crises and not being subject to 
interventions over the same period. Each subpanel illustrates the effect of one intervention. 
Treatment countries are represented by triangles and ISO codes, and squares depict the 
control group. All countries whose ISO codes are below the zero line have contractions in 
competition. For example, Thailand issued blanket guarantees in 1997 (at the bottom left-
hand corner in the left hand side of Figure 1 in the panel with blanket guarantees) when 
the Lerner index dropped by 0.14. At the same time, the control group experienced an 
increase in the Lerner index by 0.04.   
[FIGURE 1: Effects of interventions on Lerner indices and net interest margins] 
The empirical patterns are striking. Many countries experience reductions in 
competition following interventions. Increases in competition occur primarily after 
recapitalizations and liquidity support, but nationalizations also reduce margins. Yet, the 
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effects are not uniform. While several countries display substantial declines in competition, 
some countries only experience marginal declines or even increases in competition, 
suggesting the effects of interventions are amplified or mitigated depending on other 
characteristics that vary on the country level. We explore these issues in our 
Supplementary Appendix, Tables A.8 and A.9.     
B. Identification strategy  
We now turn to difference-in-difference estimations to compare treatment countries, 
i.e., countries which experienced interventions with countries in a control group before and 
after the treatment. The control group consists of countries without interventions (i.e., non-
crisis countries). Our estimator considers the time difference of the group differences, i.e., it 
accounts for omitted variables that affect treated and untreated countries alike. For 
example, Basel II may coincide with changes in competition, but as such changes affect all 
banks, the estimator only attributes the additional changes in competition to interventions. 
We use a standard difference-in-difference setup and estimate 
Cit = α + βIit + ρXit + Ai + Bt + εit        (1) 
where the dependent variable Cit denotes competition in country i during year t. The 
panel structure permits inclusion of dummy variables to eliminate time-varying omitted 
variables. We include country (A) and year dummy variables (B) to capture cross-country 
heterogeneity and year fixed effects. The country fixed effects net out any time-invariant 
unobserved country-specific factors. The year fixed effects difference away trends that 
affect treatment and control group countries such as changes in contestability, and changes 
in technology that could affect competition over time. The vector X captures time-varying 
country level control variables explained below, and εit is the error term. Our coefficient of 
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interest is β for the dummy that equals one in the years affected by the intervention I 
(blanket guarantee, liquidity support, recapitalization, nationalization), or zero otherwise.4 
The slope β provides information about the effect of interventions. Our measures of 
competition are decreasing in competition. A positive coefficient suggests decreases in 
competition, whereas a negative slope signals increases in competition.  
The vector of control variables X contains determinants of competition. Concentration 
affects competition (Claessens and Laeven (2004)). We therefore include an asset-based 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Since we compare HHIs across markets, we also 
include banking system assets (ln) to account for industry size. Moreover, we include a 
dummy for assisted mergers because several countries resolve troubled banks by merging 
them with healthier institutions. These mergers are likely to affect market structure and 
may indirectly also affect the way banks compete. 
To account for the government’s role in formulating regulation, we use a regulatory 
quality index which is increasing in regulatory quality, and is normalized between -2.5 and 
+2.5 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009)). Provided that interventions are more 
pronounced when banking systems play a bigger role in the economy, we also include a 
dummy that takes on the value of one if Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001) 
classify a financial system as bank-based, and an index ranging from 1 to 3 that classifies 
the depth of a banking system by provision of domestic credit (scaled by GDP). We also 
                                                          
4  The interventions are collinear as many of them are adopted at the same time (Supplementary Appendix A.1). While 
only 13.5% of crises countries adopt one measure, 25% adopt at least two types of rescue measures; over 31% 
announce three measures. All four types of interventions are used by 30% of the countries. We cannot include them in 
the same regression and therefore estimate regressions separately for each intervention. See also Table 3 for the 
inclusion of a dummy that takes on the value of one if any one of the four types of interventions was observed.  
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control for loan impairment charges to loans as reductions in interest income during crises 
can reduce Lerner indices and net interest margins.  
Since many countries adopt multiple interventions, we also include a dummy for 
multiple interventions that takes on the value of one if a country experienced more than 
one intervention. This variable mitigates concerns that the coefficient for the individual 
intervention is confounded by the other three interventions excluded from the regression.  
Finally, it is important to consider macroeconomic conditions. Beyond controlling for 
GDP growth, inflation, and real GDP per capita, it is important to recognize that central 
banks often use monetary policy to mitigate the strain on the financial system during crises 
(Landier, Sraer, and Thesmar (2013)). A government’s fiscal situation also plays a role for 
the ability to bail out banks, and changes in the exchange rate may also affect competition 
in banking. Since these factors are likely to have, at least indirectly, some bearing on the 
outcomes we study, we include short-term real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for 
monetary policy. Approximating monetary policy with short-term interest rates is in line 
with the literature about the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Kashyap 
and Stein (2000)), and recent work on the risk-taking channel (Jimenez et al. 
(forthcoming)). To account for governments’ ability to bail out banks, we control for 
government debt to GDP, and we also include the change of the exchange rate, measured in 
local currency units per USD in the regressions.5  Table 1 shows summary statistics. All 
variables, except for the dummy variables, are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.   
                                                          
5 
 While all regressions that include control variables contain a measure of monetary policy, the real short-term money 
market rate (ln), additional robustness tests presented in Supplementary Appendix Table A.4 contain a variable which 
measures if the central bank engaged in expansionary monetary policy, and a variable that captures increases in 
public debt during crises. Our key coefficients of interest remain unaffected in these analyses. 
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[TABLE 1: Summary statistics] 
Difference-in-difference estimations require two assumptions. First, assignment to 
treatment is plausibly exogenous with respect to competition, suggesting competition is 
not driving the interventions. Second, in the absence of treatment, changes in competition 
are similar for treatment and control groups. This is the “parallel trends” assumption.   
We first examine the exogeneity of the interventions. Table 2 presents Cox proportional 
hazard models to estimate the conditional probability of interventions. Our key 
explanatory variable captures competition (measured by the Lerner index in Panel A and 
by the net interest margin in Panel B) prior to the intervention, and we also include the 
control variables discussed above. We focus on the time from the start of our sample to the 
occurrence of interventions. The hazard rate h(t) represents the likelihood that an 
intervention is observed at time t in country i, given that there was no intervention until t. 
In employing duration analysis, we can impose a structure on the hazard function. Since we 
have no reason to assume duration dependence in the data, we use a Cox model that does 
not impose a shape on the hazard function. The model takes the form 
h(t|xi)=h0(t)exp(xiβx)         (2) 
where ho(t) denotes the baseline hazard, and βx is the vector of parameters. A positive 
coefficient for the competition measure increases the hazard of interventions. Panel A in 
Table 2 reports the results for Lerner indices, and Panel B shows the effects for net interest 
margins. The competition measures remain insignificant.6 
[TABLE 2: Exogeneity of interventions, correlations, and parallel trends] 
                                                          
6  All interventions are positively correlated (Table 2, Panel C).  
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We next examine the parallel trends assumption. It requires similar changes in 
competition between countries with interventions and the control group. This assumption 
does not require identical levels of competition between treatment and control groups, 
they are differenced out. Figure 2 shows patterns that support parallel trends, and Panel D 
in Table 2 presents t-tests in the spirit of Lemmon and Roberts (2010) for differences in 
means for changes in the competition measures between treatment and control groups 
over the three years prior to interventions. All t-tests remain insignificant.    
[FIGURE 2: Parallel trends: Behavior of competition measures] 
C. Main results  
Table 3 presents our main results for the Lerner index (Panel A) and the net interest 
margin (Panel B) using annual data. We cluster heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard 
errors on the country level to allow for serial correlation in the errors. We drop countries 
with multiple crises (Russia and Ukraine).   
[TABLE 3: The effect of government interventions on banking competition] 
All coefficients for the interventions enter negatively. While the inclusion of controls 
increases the estimation efficiency and reduces error variance, their inclusion has little 
effect on the key coefficients. All subsequent analyses always include controls. Liquidity 
support and recapitalizations are significant in Panel A, and they increase competition. 
Panel B confirms the competition-increasing effects for liquidity support, recapitalizations, 
and nationalizations.  
While an extensive discussion of the effects of all control variables is not possible due to 
space constraints, the fact that neither concentration nor the dummy for assisted bank 
mergers enter significantly is worth pointing out. A number of countries used mergers to 
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resolve ailing institutions which should result in an increase in concentration, and 
industrial economics theory suggests a corresponding reduction in competition. This, 
however, contrasts with our finding of increases in competition. In tests relegated to 
Supplementary Appendix Table A.5, we explore this empirically and regress the HHI on the 
dummy for assisted mergers and all control variables, except the HHI. The tests do not 
support the idea that assisted mergers increase concentration, a result we believe reflects 
too low a number of assisted mergers in our large cross-country study.7  
The magnitudes of the coefficients are economically meaningful. We illustrate the effects 
based on the regressions including control variables. First, the coefficients for liquidity 
support (-0.033) and recapitalizations (-0.039) are considerable given the within-country 
standard deviation of the Lerner index of 0.050. Likewise, the coefficients for liquidity 
support (-0.028), recapitalizations (-0.034), and nationalizations (-0.039) also seem large 
bearing in mind that the within-country standard deviation of the net interest margin is 
0.054. Second, the coefficients trigger location shifts in the distribution of the relative 
ranking in terms of the competitiveness of the individual countries. Thailand represents 
the median country in terms of the Lerner index. Provision of liquidity support in 1997 
reduces the Lerner index from 0.221 to 0.189, a level equivalent to Australia, located at the 
33rd percentile. Similarly, nationalizations shift the average net interest margin of 0.055 in 
Latvia in 2008 to 0.017, the level of the Slovak Republic, located at the 27th percentile.  
The volumes of liquidity support (in % of deposits and foreign liabilities) and 
recapitalizations (in % of GDP) may also matter for competition. We run t-tests to compare 
                                                          
7
  Note that the idea in industrial economics that competition and concentration are inversely related has found very 
little support in empirical work in banking. For instance, Claessens and Laeven (2004) find a positive and significant 
correlation between competition and concentration.    
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changes in competition for countries where the volumes of liquidity support and 
recapitalizations are below and above the median. The volumes do not matter. For liquidity 
support, the t-tests display values of 0.61 for the Lerner indices and -1.37 for the net 
interest margins. For recapitalizations, the t-tests are -0.24 and -0.09, respectively.   
Blanket guarantees remain insignificant. Guarantees which are not accompanied by 
other measures may not be credible, foreign creditors tend to ignore them, and some 
countries introduced unfavourable tax policies, e.g., Ecuador.   
The last columns in Panel A and B replace the individual dummies for the four 
interventions with a dummy that takes on the value of one if any one of these four 
measures is observed. The idea is to consider whether any intervention, irrespective of its 
specific design, signals future bailouts to the industry and shifts conduct towards more 
competition. These tests indeed point towards competition-increasing effects.   
D. Alternative explanations 
Next, we confront alternative explanations. A common shock, i.e., a banking crisis, rather 
than interventions may affect competition. However, we show in Section III.B that our data 
satisfy the key identification assumption of parallel trends. Further, not all coefficients 
display the same effect. If interventions serve as a proxy for crises, they should display 
similar magnitudes. This is not the case. An F-test for the null that the coefficients on the 
four interventions are equal across the regressions is rejected at the one percent 
significance level (χ2-value: 11.57, p-value: 0.00). Moreover, crisis durations are short (3.03 
years) whereas interventions remain in place for many years. For example, blanket 
guarantees lasted 78 months in Indonesia. On average, blanket guarantees are in place for 
5.2 years, and the public sector retained its equity participation for over 10 years in Japan.  
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We first examine whether our results are driven by systemic crises. The first test in the 
first subpanel in Table 4 replicates the main regressions but excludes countries with 
systemic crises. We only consider interventions in countries with borderline crises. The 
test reduces the number of interventions, but we still obtain competition-increasing effects 
for liquidity support and recapitalizations for the Lerner index. Likewise, we confirm a 
negatively significant effect of nationalizations on net interest margins. There are no 
blanket guarantees in countries with borderline crises. An alternative way to investigate 
whether our results reflect responses to systemic crises is to omit the most costly crises, 
i.e., those with the greatest rescue cost in % of GDP. If so, removing these countries should 
render our key coefficients insignificant. Omitting countries where rescue cost are equal to 
or exceed the 75th percentile of the rescue cost in the second test of the first subpanel 
leaves the key results intact.  
Our regressions already adjust for monetary policy by controlling explicitly for short-
term interest rates to mitigate concerns that lower interest rates during crises are 
responsible for our findings. To further analyze the role of interest rates, the second 
subpanel of Table 4 presents a test that helps better separate the effect of monetary policy 
on competition from the effects arising from the four direct forms of intervention by 
restricting the analysis to countries in the Eurozone. These countries have a common 
monetary policy. Since the sample size collapses to 125 observations, the results need to be 
taken with a note of caution. However, we are still able to document competition-
increasing effects from liquidity support and nationalizations in the tests for the Lerner 
index and from blanket guarantees and recapitalizations for net interest margins. 
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A final alternative explanation for our results may arise from large degrees of 
government ownership of the banking system. In particular, nationalizations give banks a 
competitive advantage to attract funds because government ownership comes with a 
subsidy arising from implicit guarantees (Acharya and Kulkarni (2013)). In other words, 
the increase in competition we find may be influenced by countries where governments 
own large parts of the banking system. If this phenomenon is responsible for our findings, 
removing countries with large shares of government ownership should render our key 
coefficients on nationalizations insignificant. The last subpanel in Table 4 removes country-
year observations where the degree of government ownership exceeds the 75th percentile 
of this variable. The sample size is reduced but the findings for the Lerner index are 
unchanged. Blanket guarantees now are weakly significant and also reduce net interest 
margins, while liquidity support becomes insignificant.   
 [TABLE 4: Robustness: Alternative explanations] 
E. Falsification tests, placebo tests and the role of demand conditions 
Table 5 presents falsification and placebo tests, and also investigates the role of demand 
effects. The first subpanel shows falsification tests. The idea is to establish that the 
significant effects from government interventions can only be observed when governments 
really intervene. Our first falsification test rules out that any type of crisis affects the 
evolution of competition between treatment and control groups differently. To this end, we 
find an event that increases competition but is unrelated to crises and then assign placebo 
interventions. We eliminate the key confounding factor, i.e., crisis observations from our 
sample, and look for instances where we observe a decline in an index which provides 
information about restrictions on bank activities (Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004)). The 
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index increases in restrictiveness, ranging from 3 to 12. It provides information about 
banks’ ability to engage in non-traditional activities (securities, insurance, and real estate), 
and restrictions on conglomerates. Since relaxations in activity restrictions increase 
competition we can analyze if such drops create similar treatment-control group patterns 
that we uncover in our main tests with the difference that the placebo interventions do not 
coincide with crises. If this falsification exercise yields significant effects, we could not rule 
out that effects like deregulation create similar patterns in the data. The placebo 
interventions are assigned to the first year in which a country relaxes activity restrictions. 
The durations of these placebo interventions are randomly generated based on the 
durations of the actual durations of the four interventions. To avoid confounding effects of 
multiple relaxations of activity restrictions per country, we omit countries with multiple 
reductions of the index, resulting in 37 placebo interventions. None of these placebo 
interventions displays significance. 
 Our second falsification test simulates fake crises, defined as periods of at least three 
consecutive years of declines in bank capital during periods when our database does not 
classify a country as having had a crisis. We assign placebo interventions to the first year in 
which a country experienced a fake crisis, and the durations of these placebo interventions 
are randomly generated using the distributions of the actual durations of the interventions. 
The coefficients on the placebo interventions remain indistinguishable from zero.  
The second subpanel offers a standard placebo test where we pretend the interventions 
occurred two years prior to the actual occurrence. The idea behind this analysis is to lend 
more support to the key identifying assumption of parallel trends. The placebo treatments 
should remain insignificant. This is the case.  
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The same subpanel also focuses on pro-competitive restructuring policies in the EU. If 
our findings are driven by forced divestments, and other measures by the EU to maintain a 
level playing field of competition following interventions, removing these countries should 
render our key coefficients insignificant. This is not the case.   
To rule out that demand effects drive our results, the final subpanel shows auxiliary 
tests for associations between Lerner indices and net interest margins as dependent 
variable and GDP growth as a proxy for demand conditions as explanatory variable. Loan 
demand may be weak or banks may be risk-averse and shift lending to higher quality 
borrowers during crises. Such behavior may reduce Lerner indices and net interest 
margins. We first run tests of competition measures on GDP growth and year and country 
dummies for the full sample. Subsequently, we show the results for subsamples that omit 
crises but constrain the tests to recession periods (defined as at least two consecutive years 
of contractions of GDP growth). All correlations remain insignificant. These tests mitigate 
concerns that poor demand causes the declines in Lerner indices and net interest margins.8 
  [TABLE 5: Robustness: Falsification tests, placebo tests, and demand conditions] 
F. Long-run effects of government interventions 
We acknowledge in Section III.D that the duration of the policy measures goes beyond 
the duration of the crises. To lend further support to the idea that competitive effects are 
                                                          
8
  Our Supplementary Appendix contains further sensitivity checks. Table A.6 examines alternative ways of clustering 
standard errors by years, and we include additional control variables to consider that some countries set up asset 
management agencies. We also test if the too-big-to-fail and the too-many-to-fail phenomena drive our findings, and 
we examine subsamples of countries which omit high income economies and emerging market economies. Further 
tests weight our regressions with the inverse of the number of interventions per country to assign less importance 
to countries with multiple interventions, and we also include a dummy variable for the onset of a crisis as the 
interventions may occur following the year after the crisis struck. Table A.7 replicates our tests with an alternative 
measure of competition, the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic, which gauges revenue elasticities with respect to 
changes in input prices. Our key results remain very similar across these additional tests.  
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not reversed, Figure 3 traces the evolution of average values of the competition measures 
in countries that had interventions over the five years following their announcement.  
[FIGURE 3: Long–run effects] 
The dark bars represent competition in the announcement year of the intervention. The 
light bars track competition measures over the five subsequent years. Lerner indices 
remain below the initial level following the interventions. The effects are particularly 
strong in the first three years. While there is some reversal in the fourth and fifth year 
when considering the Lerner index, interest margins experience a hefty drop in the first 
two years (with the exception of blanket guarantees), and remain compressed.    
Table 6 shows regressions that measure competition one (t+1), three (t+3), and five 
(t+5) years after interventions. For Lerner indices, we find competition-increasing effects 
at t+1 (liquidity support and recapitalizations), persistent effects at t+3 and even at t+5, 
when nationalizations still enter significantly. For interest margins, the tests suggest the 
effects materialize quickly. Most coefficients at t+1 and t+3 are insignificant. At t+5, blanket 
guarantees, recapitalizations, and nationalizations display again significance.9  
  [TABLE 6: Long-run effects] 
 
                                                          
9
  We present extensions in our Supplementary Appendix. Table A.8, Panel A, establishes heterogeneous responses to 
the interventions by considering whether initial market characteristics in terms of structure, contestability, and moral 
hazard amplify or mitigate the effects. Increases in competition are greater in magnitude in concentrated markets but 
the negative relation between interventions and competition is mitigated in countries with more foreign banks. 
Reductions in the Lerner index tend to be larger in systems with more entry restrictions. Panel B in Table A.8 focuses 
on the question whether interventions undermine market discipline. We use a Transparency index, ranging from 0 to 
5 (Barth et al. (2004)) which consists of a dummy that takes on the value of one if an external audit is required and an 
accounting index which increases in the quality of bank accounts. We interact this Transparency index with the 
intervention dummies. Except for blanket guarantees for Lerner indices, all coefficients for the interaction terms enter 
significantly positively. This suggests that the effects of interventions are mitigated as transparency increases. Table 
A.9 examines theories by Keeley (1990) and Cordella and Yeyati (2003) which assign a role to charter values for 
banks’ incentives to compete. To this end, we interact charter values, reflected in the ratio of current deposits to total 
deposits, and money market and short-term funding, with interventions. Neither charter values nor the interaction 
terms enter significantly.      
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G. Instrumental variable regressions  
Interventions may be endogenous to the depth of the crisis, and are therefore not 
randomly assigned. This lack of random assignment constitutes an endogeneity problem. 
We address this issue with instrumental variables and show results from a two-stage 
estimator. We use a linear probability model in the first stage, and use the same set of 
instruments for all interventions. The second stage uses the estimated probabilities.  
Our instruments draw from different strands of literature. First, Brown and Dinc (2005) 
show bailouts occur after elections, whereas the period before an election reduces the 
likelihood of interventions. Two instruments capture the electoral cycle. The first one is a 
dummy that takes on the value of one in the year of parliamentary elections, and the 
second one provides information about the time (years) since the last parliamentary 
election. Both variables should correlate negatively with interventions. A further 
instrument provides information about the orientation of the largest government party. We 
use a dummy that takes on the value of one if the largest government party has a right-wing 
orientation. Governments led by such parties focus on market-oriented policies to increase 
chances of re-election (Bortolotti and Faccio (2009)). Moreover, their partisan orientation 
impacts bailout propensities. While left-wing governments are keen to intervene into the 
economy to preserve jobs, right-wing governments oppose such actions (Garrett and Lange 
(1991)). As an additional variable we use population (log) to reflect on the fact that 
countries with fewer inhabitants such as Ireland and Iceland deployed bank rescue 
packages as their financial sector is large relative to the economy. This relationship is less 
pronounced in larger economies. We expect a negative coefficient.  
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Second, we build on the idea that the regulatory architecture matters for bailouts. We 
use a prompt corrective power index to capture legal requirements that establish levels of 
bank solvency deterioration that trigger regulatory enforcements and the scope of 
supervisors in applying such powers. The index increases in corrective power, ranging 
from 0 to 6. We expect powerful regulators to press for bailout packages. In addition, we 
also use information about the number of bank supervisors with more than ten years of 
experience as such key staff is more likely to detect the build-up of problems and take 
corrective measures in the banks prior to the evolution of crises. We expect a negative sign. 
Moreover, a regulator with a large budget is also more likely to embark on rescue activities. 
Thus, we include the budget of the supervisory agency and expect a positive coefficient.  
Third, we consider Europe specifically where concerns about crisis contagion have been 
prominent. We include a dummy for EU membership, and we also include a dummy for a 
crisis in a contiguous country.  To reflect on the problems in Europe, we use an interaction 
term between these variables and expect a positive sign. Finally, we exploit ideas according 
to which bailouts occur because of doubts about the accuracy with which markets assess 
bank asset value. Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2013) claim interventions occur 
because markets cannot differentiate between sound and unsound banks. This spike in 
information asymmetries motivates bailouts. To capture opacity, we focus on asset 
composition and examine banks’ securities portfolios. As instruments, we use available for 
sale (AFS) and held to maturity (HTM) securities, scaled by total securities. The former are 
marked at fair value and should reduce opacity and the likelihood of interventions. The 
latter are reported at amortized cost, and make balance sheets more opaque.  
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Panel A of Table 7 confirms our previous results. While the sample size shrinks due to 
the availability of instruments and we remain therefore cautious assigning weight to these 
tests, we confirm all previous effects for net interest margins. 
Panel B shows the 1st stage. All instruments exhibit the anticipated sign and are 
significant in at least one of the first stage regressions, except for the number of 
supervisors with more than ten years of experience and the dummy for crises in contiguous 
counties. The Hansen J-statistic for the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the 
error cannot reject their exogeneity with the exception of the regression for blanket 
guarantees and nationalizations for net interest margins. All first stage F-tests are above 
the rule of thumb of ten, and the Kleibergen-Paap tests reject weak instruments. For all 
specifications, we obtain statistics above the tabulated critical values for a size bias of ten 
% relative to OLS.   
[TABLE 7: Instrumental variable regressions] 
H. Heckman selection regressions 
The fact that government interventions only occur in response to crises but not 
otherwise may also give rise to a selection problem, another potential source of bias. This 
section presents results from a Heckman selection model (Heckman (1979)) to mitigate 
such concerns. To reflect on the fact that interventions can only be observed during crises, 
we model first the occurrence of a crisis (zero otherwise). We use two variables that are 
excluded from the second stage equation. These two covariates should satisfy the criterion 
that they validly predict the occurrence of banking crises but do not directly affect 
competition. Our first variable is the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) show that crises are more likely in countries prone to sudden capital 
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outflows. The second variable is credit growth, in real terms, deflated by the CPI (lagged by 
one year). The growth rate is based on annual changes in credit from the banking system to 
the private sector. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have shown that crises are preceded by 
credit booms.   
Table 8 presents the results from the two-stage Heckman selection models. The 1st stage 
regressions are identical across the four different government interventions and we only 
report them once per panel. The ratio of M2 to reserves enters significantly with the 
anticipated positive sign for the effect on banking crises, and so does credit growth. The 
coefficients on the key variables of interest in the second stage tend to be greater than 
those obtained with the difference-in-difference regressions, and they are also larger than 
those from the instrumental variables tests. However, the inverse Mills ratio remains 
insignificant, and does not point towards selection problems.  
[TABLE 8: Heckman selection regressions] 
IV. Evolution of zombie banks 
We now examine what drives the shift towards competition. It is plausible to assume 
that interventions keep unviable banks in business as a going concern. If so, the 
Schumpeterian process of creative destruction is suppressed, and insolvent zombie banks 
can keep on originating risky loans with negative net present values but substantial upside 
potential (Kane (1990)). Limited liability in combination with government support puts 
them in a no-lose situation. Zombies are incentivized to prey on their rivals’ market shares. 
If these conjectures are true, we should find positive associations between the evolution of 
zombie banks and government interventions.  
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For this analysis, we use two alternative definitions of zombie banks. The first definition 
uses book values of equity to classify zombie banks. We compute banks’ tangible capital as 
common equity minus intangible assets, consisting of goodwill, other intangibles, and 
deferred tax assets (Kroszner and Strahan (1996)). Next, we code a dummy that takes on 
the value one if tangible capital is negative, and then calculate these zombie banks’ market 
shares for deposit and loan markets.  
Our alternative definition of zombie banks relies on market values based on the market 
capitalization for common and preferred shares. We use market data because book values 
of equity for banks may be sticky, in particular during crises when regulators may forbear.  
The use of market data is however not without disadvantages. In our large cross-country 
sample with many emerging markets, only 2,138 of the 21,988 banks are publicly listed. 
Moreover, any analysis using market data excludes medium-sized and small banks which 
are less likely to be listed, resulting in a substantially reduced and less representative 
sample. With these caveats in mind, we define a zombie bank based on market values of 
bank equity as a bank whose liabilities exceed the market value of equity. We view the tests 
using market data as a sensitivity check for the inferences obtained from the book values of 
bank equity. The correlations between the market based measures of zombie banks and 
those based on book values are 0.16 (p-value 0.011) for deposit market shares, and 0.12 (p-
value 0.058) for the loan market shares. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of zombie banks for the 5 years following the government 
interventions. The four panels on the left focus on zombie banks using the definition based 
on book values, and the four panels on the right illustrate the evolution of zombie banks 
using market data. Using book values, we find that zombie banks increase market shares 
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after interventions until the second and third year and only then their market shares start 
to decline. In the second year, zombie banks that are not dismantled increase market share 
to up to 9% in the case of blanket guarantees. For liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations, zombie banks’ market shares increase to 5%. The patterns for market 
data are similar, except for a less pronounced decline in years 4 and 5, which is likely a 
reflection of market values of bank shares remaining compressed after crises. Nevertheless, 
despite the reduced sample size, the findings using the market based measures for zombie 
banks largely reinforce the inferences from the tests using book values.  
[FIGURE 4: Evolution of zombie banks] 
Table 9 shows regressions with the market shares of zombie banks as dependent 
variables. We present tests based on book values and market values. We show the results 
for the full sample using the deposit market share in Panel A and the loan market share in 
Panel B. None of the coefficients is significant. Panel C and Panel D restrict the sample to 
crisis countries to focus on the variation over time in zombie banks’ market shares within 
crisis countries because the effects from interventions, if any, on zombie banks should be 
more pronounced. Liquidity support and recapitalizations are now positively and 
significantly associated with the market shares for deposits and loans of zombie banks in 
the analyses based on book values.  The tests relying on a market based definition of 
zombie banks offer some evidence for a weakly significant and positive effect of 
recapitalizations and nationalizations on deposit and loan and market shares, respectively.  
Additional tests lend more support to the idea that zombie banks evolve simultaneously 
with interventions. Panel E and F illustrate a largely monotonous relationship between the 
frequency of interventions and zombie banks’ market shares. While these results may 
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simply be a reflection of crisis intensity, Panel G and H challenge this view. Large increases 
in competition (in terms of the declines of Lerner indices and net interest margins) 
coincide with greater presence of zombie banks. Taken together, these tests offer some 
evidence that zombie banks seem a driving force behind the increase in competition by 
collectively increasing market shares and crowding out healthy competitors.   
[TABLE 9: Zombie banks] 
V. Effects of interventions on depositors and borrowers  
Our tests so far focus on producer welfare. We now examine how consumers are 
affected. While stabilizing effects arise from the interventions as they help restore 
confidence and avoid disruptive bank closures, our emphasis is on pricing effects. This 
analysis allows evaluating which parties benefit from increases in competition. Further, we 
can test whether increases in competition are driven by supplanted market discipline 
which shows up in lower deposit rates or by moral hazard, reflected in lower loan rates.  
A. Pricing effects: Loan and deposit rates  
Table 10 documents pricing effects. We replace the competition measures as dependent 
variables with average deposit and average loan rates, computed by dividing interest 
expenses by total deposits and money market funding, and interest income by total loans. 
Panel A shows that liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations reduce funding 
costs. This is not surprising. The interventions not only make banks safer and depositors 
consequently require lower returns but they also undermine market discipline which 
additionally contributes to lower funding costs. In addition, the findings for the rate-
reducing effect from recapitalizations also support the theory by Allen, Carletti, and 
Marquez (2011). They propose more capital enables banks to compete more effectively. 
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Our analysis of loan rates in Panel B documents moral hazard. We find rate-reducing 
effects for liquidity support and recapitalizations. The latter is consistent with Black and 
Hazelwood (2013). They show TARP banks charge lower rates. Nationalizations also 
reduce loan rates (Sapienza (2004)). Our tests highlight the disparate effects. While 
interventions help borrowers, they harm depositors. Moreover, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients in the loan rate equations tend to be greater than in the deposit rate equations. 
Thus, the moral hazard effect dominates advantages from supplanted market discipline.10  
Next, we revisit our argument that zombie banks drive competition. If so, the effects of 
interventions on interest rates should be less pronounced once we omit years with zombie 
banks, but should be greater once we examine only countries with zombies. Indeed, the 
magnitudes decline in Panel C and D when we drop years with zombie banks, measured 
using book values. In contrast, they increase in Panel E and F where we focus on countries 
that have at least one year of data with zombie banks, again measured using book values.   
 [TABLE 10: Pricing effects: Deposit and loan rates] 
B. Pricing effects: Alternative explanations  
Table 11 addresses alternative explanations. The results for the effects on deposit and 
loan rates may be affected by flights to safety from non-bank depositors to government-
supported banks. Moreover, some countries increased deposit insurance coverage in 
recent years which could also affect customers’ propensity to deposit their savings with 
banks. Panel A in Table 11 demonstrates that deposit volumes do not significantly differ in 
the years prior to and following interventions, i.e., declines in deposit rates are unlikely to 
                                                          
10  As an alternative way to examine this, Table A.10 in the Supplementary Appendix shows the components of the Lerner 
index, marginal cost and the product price as dependent variables. Prices are reduced and marginal costs decline. The 
coefficients for price declines tend to be greater than the reductions in marginal cost, thus banks’ market power 
shrinks and competition increases.  
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be driven by increased deposit supply. In Panel B, we remove countries whose deposit 
insurance coverage limits increased. This test supports our previous inferences, with 
greater magnitudes for the key coefficients. Panel C revisits the concern that the subsidy 
which comes with government ownership of banks drives the lower interest rates by 
omitting observations where government ownership of the banking system exceeds the 
75th percentile. The interventions are insignificant in the tests for deposit rates (except for 
nationalizations which are weakly significant), suggesting that government ownership 
plays a role for the pricing effects. Loan rates remain significantly affected in this test. Thus, 
while there is evidence that government ownership reduces funding costs and the pricing 
effects for deposit rates are not necessarily a consequence of interventions, the causal 
effect of interventions on loan rates remains intact.   
[TABLE 11: Pricing effects: Alternative explanations] 
VI. Concluding remarks  
The effects of government aid for the banking sector are not yet well understood. We 
show how blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations 
affect banking competition. In addition, we show how zombie banks evolve following such 
interventions, and we evaluate how interventions affect the pricing of deposits and loans.   
Our result suggests that reservations by policymakers that interventions reduce banking 
competition are overstated. Liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations 
increase competition. This is important because the pro-competitive effects may increase 
real investment, and such effects might offset much of the deadweight cost associated with 
government support. We also find some indication in the data that zombie banks play a role 
for increases in competition. In countries struck by crises, we show that their market 
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shares are positively correlated with liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations. We also find that the frequency of interventions coincides with greater 
market shares of zombie banks.   
We acknowledge two limitations. First, our data do not consider how interventions are 
administered. We cannot establish whether capital support was provided to the weakest 
banks in some countries while it may be given to healthier ones elsewhere. Second, our 
tests leave open the possibility that unobservables which coincide with the interventions 
drive our inferences.  
Our second key result is that borrowers and depositors are affected disparately. The 
finding that interest margins are reduced is driven by lower loan rates, suggesting moral 
hazard. In contrast, there is little evidence that deposit rates are reduced as a consequence 
of interventions. While we also find reductions of deposit rates, this result is primarily 
driven by government ownership.   
In sum, banks’ conduct following government aid is conditional on the government 
measures. Beyond prolonged and misdirected support of zombie institutions which causes 
congestion as they prevent the exit of insolvent institutions, government interventions 
shape banks’ expectations about future interventions. Reducing bailout expectations, tying 
government assistance to the restructuring of troubled assets, identifying zombie banks via 
stress tests, and facilitating their exit via resolution mechanisms are important avenues for 
policy reform and future research.    
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variable N Mean p5 p95 S.D. Source 
Dependent variables      
Lerner index 1687 0.247 0.082 0.483 0.117 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Net interest margin 1687 0.064 0.001 0.217 0.087 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Deposit market share of zombie banks (book values) 1528 0.013 0 0.041 0.075 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Deposit market share of zombie banks (market values) 257 0.043 0 0.101 0.030 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Loan market share of zombie banks (book values) 1528 0.014 0 0.039 0.079 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Loan market share of zombie banks (market values) 257 0.041 0 0.092 0.028 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Deposit rate 1687 0.134 0.007 0.395 0.283 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Loan rate 1687 0.208 0.040 0.798 0.289 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Key variables        
Blanket guarantee 1687 0.069 0 1 0.255 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) 
Liquidity support 1687 0.136 0 1 0.343 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) 
Recapitalizations 1687 0.145 0 1 0.353 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) 
Nationalizations 1687 0.127 0 1 0.333 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) 
Control variables       
Concentration (HHI) 1687 0.321 0.082 0.870 0.229 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Total banking system assets (ln) 1687 9.837 5.524 14.700 2.748 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Assisted mergers 1687 0.014 0 1 0.120 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) 
Regulatory quality index 1687 0.230 -1.115 1.730 0.876 Kaufmann et al. (2009) 
Bank-based financial system 1687 0.759 0 1 0.427 Beck et al. (2001) 
Financial development indicator 1687 1.987 1 3 0.831 World Bank Development Indicators, authors’ calculations 
Loan impairment charges/Loans 1687 0.015 0 0.046 0.027 BankScope, authors’ calculations 
Multiple interventions 1687 0.026 0 0 0.161 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) 
GDP growth  1687 0.042 -0.027 0.102 0.042 World Bank Development Indicators 
Inflation 1687 0.074 -0.003 0.218 0.133 World Bank Development Indicators 
Real GDP/Capita 1687 7669.311 234.713 31290.27 10259.77 World Bank Development Indicators 
Real money market rate (ln) 1687 1.470 -1.375 3.348 1.933 World Bank Development Indicators 
Government debt /GDP 1687 56.662 11.785 120.249 35.736 International Financial Statistics  
Exchange rate 1687 0.011 -0.031 0.096 0.442 World Bank Development Indicators 
Other variables       
Foreign-owned banks (assets in %) 1588 0.356 0 0.913 0.302 Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Activity restrictions index 1313 6.771 4 10 1.785 Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Entry restrictions index 1332 7.427 6 8 1.099 Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Explicit deposit insurance 1326 0.658 0 1 0.474 Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Transparency index 1142 4.498 3 5 0.656 Barth et al. (2001, 2004) 
Instruments and identifying covariates       
Election year  929 0.210 0 1 0.408 Parties and Elections, Center on Democratic Performance, Electionresources.org 
Time since last election 929 2.510 0 8 2.392 Parties and Elections, Center on Democratic Performance, Electionresources.org 
Government party with right-wing orientation 929 0.326 0 1 0.469 Parties and Elections, Center on Democratic Performance, Electionresources.org 
Population (log) 929 16.341 13.895 18.830 1.555 World Bank Development Indicators 
Prompt corrective power 929 2.452 0 6 2.491 Barth et al. (2004) 
Bank supervisors > 10 years of  experience 929 78.856 2.5 266.6 214.391 Barth et al. (2004) 
Budget for supervision 929 424.894 0.096 424.894 2667.968 Barth et al. (2004) 
EU member country 929 0.1553 0 1 0.362 European Commission  
Contiguous country with crisis 929 0.053 0 1 0.225 Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013); CEPII http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm 
AFS securities/Total securities 929 0.604 0 0.442 0.564 BankScope, author’s calculations 
HTM securities/Total securities 929 0.280 0 0.493 0.036 BankScope, authors‘ calculations 
M2/Foreign reserves 1687 0.335 0 0.775 0.198 Wolrd Bank Development Indicators 
Real credit growth (t-1) 1687 0.110 -0.132 0.440 0.176 International Financial Statistics 
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Table 2 
Exogeneity of government interventions with respect to competition, correlations, and tests for parallel trends  
We present Cox proportional hazard (Cox PH) models to verify that blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations are exogenous with respect to competition, measured by the Lerner 
index in Panel A and by the net interest margin in Panel B. The dependent variable denotes the hazard of observing blanket guarantees, liquidity support, significant recapitalizations, or nationalizations. Our sample 
period is 1996 – 2010. A country is dropped from the analysis once it experienced the intervention of interest. The vector of control variables (not shown) includes an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to 
capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality 
index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of 
loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for 
monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies are included. Panel C shows correlations between the four 
dummy variables for government interventions (blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations). Panel D presents t-tests for the assumption of parallel trends in changes in the Lerner 
index and the net interest margin between treatment group countries and the control group for the three years prior to blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, or nationalizations. Standard errors are 
clustered on the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Panel A: Lerner index Panel B: Net interest margin 
 Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalizations Nationalizations Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalizations Nationalizations 
 Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH Cox PH 
Competition 0.313 -0.429 -2.292 -3.652 0.283 -1.888 0.203 0.139 
 
(0.09) (-0.19) (-0.94) (-1.21) (0.15) (-1.23) (0.11) (0.07) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1430 1363 1327 1361 1430 1363 1327 1361 
Panel C: Correlation matrix for government interventions 
   Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalizations 
    Blanket guarantee 1 
  
    Liquidity support 0.595*** 1 
 
 
(0.00) 
  Recapitalizations 0.663*** 0.780*** 1 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 Nationalizations 0.717*** 0.822*** 0.859*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel D: Parallel trends  Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalizations Nationalizations 
 Treatment Control t-test Treatment Control t-test Treatment Control t-test Treatment Control t-test 
∆ Lerner index (t-1)  0.054 -0.022 -1.60 -0.000 -0.015 -0.63 -0.004 -0.023 -0.79 -0.005 -0.021 -0.52 
∆ Lerner index (t-2)  0.016 -0.023 -1.05 -0.040 -0.041 -0.02 -0.044 -0.038 0.17 0.000 -0.030 -1.05 
∆ Lerner index (t-3)  -0.019 0.017 1.05 0.009 0.029 0.77 0.012 0.030 0.61 0.005 0.024 0.46 
∆ Net interest margin (t-1) 0.004 0.009 0.29 -0.001 0.003 0.35 -0.004 0.004 0.45 -0.006 0.008 0.59 
∆ Net interest margin (t-2) -0.006 -0.002 0.53 -0.006 -0.004 0.59 -0.007 -0.004 0.68 -0.005 -0.004 0.13 
∆ Net interest margin (t-3) 0.068 0.047 -0.21 0.009 0.008 -0.02 0.011 0.012 0.05 0.021 0.017 -0.11 
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Table 3 
Main results: The effect of government interventions on banking competition 
The table presents difference-in-difference regressions of the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on competition, measured by the Lerner index in Panel A and by the net interest 
margin in Panel B. We report regressions excluding and including control variables, and the final column in each panel uses a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if any one of these measures was observed. The 
control variables are an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one 
if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on 
domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market 
rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the 
country level.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Panel A: Lerner index Panel B: Net interest margin 
 No  
controls 
With 
controls 
No 
 controls 
With 
controls 
No 
 controls 
With 
controls 
No 
 controls 
With 
controls 
Any 
intervention 
No  
controls 
With 
controls 
No  
controls 
With 
controls 
No  
controls 
With 
controls 
No 
 controls 
With 
controls 
Any 
intervention 
Concentration (HHI)  -0.033  -0.033  -0.032  -0.033 -0.033  -0.016  -0.016  -0.015  -0.014 -0.015 
  (-1.51)  (-1.52)  (-1.47)  (-1.49) (-1.49)  (-1.30)  (-1.33)  (-1.27)  (-1.19) (-1.28) 
Total banking system assets (ln)  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.022** -0.022**  -0.015*  -0.015*  -0.015*  -0.015* -0.015* 
  (-2.29)  (-2.26)  (-2.30)  (-2.28) (-2.26)  (-1.71)  (-1.68)  (-1.71)  (-1.73) (-1.67) 
Assisted mergers   0.001  0.002  0.003  -0.003 0.002  -0.009  -0.006  -0.006  -0.003 -0.005 
  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (-0.15) (0.09)  (-0.72)  (-0.56)  (-0.57)  (-0.29) (-0.46) 
Regulatory quality index  0.007  0.002  0.002  0.007 0.003  0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.27)  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.29) (0.12)  (0.16)  (-0.13)  (-0.09)  (-0.15) (-0.13) 
Bank-based financial system  0.116***  0.104***  0.114***  0.111*** 0.112***  0.044*  0.035  0.044*  0.043* 0.042 
  (2.99)  (2.63)  (2.87)  (2.87) (2.84)  (1.69)  (1.37)  (1.69)  (1.66) (1.63) 
Financial development indicator  0.032  0.024  0.034  0.025 0.031  0.019  0.014  0.023  0.026 0.022 
  (0.78)  (0.60)  (0.86)  (0.63) (0.77)  (0.49)  (0.37)  (0.60)  (0.67) (0.57) 
Loan impairment charges/Gross loans  0.108  0.109  0.107  0.103 0.107  0.492***  0.494***  0.492***  0.494*** 0.493*** 
  (0.72)  (0.74)  (0.73)  (0.68) (0.72)  (2.77)  (2.81)  (2.81)  (2.81) (2.81) 
Multiple interventions  -0.015  -0.003  0.000  -0.015 -0.005  0.016  0.026  0.029*  0.025 0.028* 
  (-0.84)  (-0.16)  (0.01)  (-0.79) (-0.25)  (1.08)  (1.56)  (1.67)  (1.55) (1.66) 
GDP growth   0.167  0.161  0.152  0.172 0.161  0.042  0.035  0.027  0.032 0.032 
  (1.26)  (1.21)  (1.14)  (1.29) (1.22)  (0.61)  (0.51)  (0.37)  (0.44) (0.47) 
Inflation  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.004 0.004  0.069  0.068  0.068  0.068 0.069 
  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.12) (0.10)  (1.59)  (1.56)  (1.56)  (1.56) (1.57) 
Real GDP/capita  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.26)  (-0.21)  (-0.22)  (-0.27) (-0.23)  (-1.28)  (-1.22)  (-1.22)  (-1.27) (-1.23) 
Real money market rate (ln)  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.001 0.000  0.003  0.003  0.003  0.003 0.003 
  (0.29)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.36) (0.06)  (1.64)  (1.50)  (1.46)  (1.51) (1.42) 
Government debt/GDP  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002 0.001 
  (0.50)  (0.24)  (0.55)  (0.32) (0.48)  (1.09)  (0.87)  (1.34)  (1.45) (1.31) 
Exchange rate   0.009**  0.010**  0.010**  0.010** 0.010**  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 -0.004 
  (2.02)  (2.06)  (2.04)  (2.04) (2.05)  (-0.82)  (-0.79)  (-0.80)  (-0.79) (-0.79) 
Blanket guarantee -0.031 -0.025        -0.012 -0.014        
 (-1.44) (-1.04)        (-0.62) (-0.56)        
Liquidity support   -0.036** -0.033*        -0.022* -0.028*      
   (-2.35) (-1.92)        (-1.68) (-1.89)      
Recapitalizations    -0.033 -0.043*** -0.039**        -0.026** -0.034**    
     (-2.65) (-2.11)        (-2.07) (-2.23)    
Nationalizations       -0.011 -0.001        -0.032** -0.039**  
       (-0.62) (-0.04)        (-2.01) (-2.13)  
Any intervention         -0.028**         -0.033** 
         (-2.00)         (-2.24) 
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R2 0.230 0.242 0.233 0.243 0.234 0.244 0.230 0.241 0.243 0.624 0.661 0.626 0.663 0.626 0.664 0.627 0.665 0.665 
Number of interventions 11 11 34 34 32 32 26 26 39 11 11 34 34 32 32 26 26 39 
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Table 4 
Robustness: Alternative explanations 
This table deals with alternative explanations. The dependent variable is the Lerner index in Panel A and the net interest margin in Panel B. The first subpanel rules out reactions to banking crises. We first run the regressions 
on a subsample where the treatment countries only include borderline crises. Since blanket guarantees do not occur in countries with borderline crises, we only consider the three remaining interventions. The second test in 
the first subpanel removes the most costly banking crises. Specifically, we omit countries where the fiscal cost in % of GDP of the crisis is equal to or above the 75th percentile of the distribution of the rescue cost of all 
crises as an alternative way to verify that our main results are not a reflection of a crisis. The second subpanel focuses on the role of monetary policy. We present difference-in-difference regressions identical to those shown 
in Table 3 for a sample constrained to countries in the Eurozone. The third subpanel offers a test to mitigate concerns that high degrees of government ownership of the banking system drive our inferences. To this end, we 
omit country-year observations where the government owns a large proportion of the banking system, defined as government ownership exceeding the 75th percentile of the government ownership variable. All regressions 
include the control variables explained in the notes to Table 3. Country and year dummies included. Standard errors clustered on the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Panel A: Lerner index  Panel B: Net interest margins 
Subpanel: Ruling out reactions to crises by Omitting systemic crises Removing costly crises Omitting systemic crises Removing costly crises 
Blanket guarantee  n/a    -0.028    n/a    -0.013    
     (-1.38)        (-0.43)    
Liquidity support  -0.042**    -0.033*    -0.042    -0.028*   
  (-2.21)    (-1.95)    (-1.37)    (-1.76)   
Recapitalizations   -0.074***    -0.039**    -0.055    -0.034**  
   (-4.30)    (-2.15)    (-1.47)    (-2.10)  
Nationalizations    -0.010    0.000    -0.097**    -0.039** 
    (-0.24)    (0.02)    (-2.10)    (-2.00) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  1296 1296 1296 1630 1630 1630 1630  1296 1296 1296 1630 1630 1630 1630 
R2  0.256 0.258 0.254 0.247 0.249 0.250 0.247  0.678 0.679 0.681 0.663 0.667 0.668 0.668 
Number of interventions  11 9 3 7 30 28 22  11 9 3 7 30 28 22 
Subpanel: The role of monetary policy Sample constrained to Eurozone countries Sample constrained to Eurozone countries 
Blanket guarantee  0.050       -0.013***        
 (1.08)       (-3.19)        
Liquidity support  -0.080*       0.005     
  (-2.06)       (0.63)     
Recapitalizations   -0.031        -0.012**   
   (-0.51)        (-2.56)   
Nationalizations     -0.093*        0.000 
     (-2.02)        (0.03) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125  125  125  125 
R2 0.338 0.339 0.335 0.355 0.738  0.731  0.738  0.730 
Number of interventions 2 9 6 5 2  9  6  5 
Subpanel: The role of government ownership of banks Sample excludes country-year observations where government ownership > 75th percentile  Sample excludes country-year observations where government ownership > 75th percentile 
Blanket guarantee  -0.018       -0.031*       
 (-0.43)       (-1.96)       
Liquidity support   -0.041*       -0.016     
   (-1.82)       (-1.29)     
Recapitalizations     -0.053**       -0.029*   
     (-2.24)       (-1.91)   
Nationalizations       0.007       -0.027* 
       (0.24)       (-1.69) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 
R2 0.263 0.268 0.269 0.263 0.675 0.675 0.676 0.676 
Number of interventions 5 23 22 15 5 23 22 15 
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Table 5 
Robustness: Falsification tests, placebo tests, and the role of demand effects 
This table shows falsification tests and placebo tests, and we also analyze the role of demand effects. The dependent variable is the Lerner index in Panel A and the net interest margin in Panel B.  The first subpanel offers 
falsification tests. The first falsification test assigns interventions to countries that are likely to experience an increase in competition, triggered by a drop in an index that captures activity restrictions, and the second 
falsification test is based on fake crises, defined as episodes during which a country’s banking system experiences contractions in the average bank’s capital ratio in three consecutive years. The second subpanel offers 
standard placebo tests where we pretend that the interventions occurred two years prior to the actual announcement of the intervention. This subpanel also presents a test which drops all EU countries from the sample to rule 
out that pro-competitive measures by the EU commission drive our key inferences. In the final subpanel, we focus on the correlation between GDP growth as a proxy for demand effects and our two competition measures. 
We run regressions on the full sample, and also on a subsample which omits recession periods (defined as two consecutive years of contractions of GDP growth) and crisis periods. These regressions only include year 
dummies and country dummies, all other regressions in this table include the control variables explained in the notes to Table 3, and also country and year dummies. Standard errors clustered on the country level. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Lerner index  Panel B: Net interest margins 
Subpanel: Falsification tests Falsification test (drop in activity restrictions) Falsification test (fake crises) Falsification test (drop in activity restrictions) Falsification test (fake crises) 
Blanket guarantee  0.025    -0.009    -0.003    0.005    
 (1.65)    (-0.57)    (-0.38)    (0.67)    
Liquidity support 
 -0.005    -0.000    0.005    0.009   
 
 (-0.32)    (-0.00)    (0.51)    (0.94)   
Recapitalizations 
  0.001    -0.020    0.002    0.002  
 
  (0.08)    (-1.18)    (0.18)    (0.27)  
Nationalizations 
   -0.001    -0.016    0.001    0.004 
 
   (-0.08)    (-1.09)    (0.11)    (0.51) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 831 831 831 831 1687 1687 1687 1687 831 831 831 831 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R2 0.290 0.286 0.286 0.286 0.241 0.241 0.243 0.242 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.643 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.661 
Number of interventions 37 37 37 37 60 60 60 60 37 37 37 37 60 60 60 60 
Subpanel: Placebo tests and removing EU countries       Standard placebo regressions Removing EU countries Standard placebo regressions Removing EU countries 
Blanket guarantee  0.002    -0.039    0.002    -0.014    
 (0.09)    (-1.33)    (0.09)    (-0.33)    
Liquidity support 
 -0.020    -0.050**   
 -0.020    -0.046*   
 
 (-1.03)    (-2.28)   
 (-1.03)    (-1.81)   
Recapitalizations 
  -0.027    -0.046*  
  -0.027    -0.050**  
 
  (-1.40)    (-1.97)  
  (-1.40)    (-2.21)  
Nationalizations 
   -0.025    -0.016 
   -0.025    -0.061** 
 
   (-1.16)    (-0.65) 
   (-1.16)    (-2.26) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1644 1644 1644 1644 1425 1425 1425 1425 1644 1644 1644 1644 1425 1425 1425 1425 
R2 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.249 0.251 0.254 0.253 0.251 0.673 0.674 0.675 0.674 0.654 0.659 0.660 0.662 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 8 20 21 18 11 34 32 26 8 20 21 18 
Subpanel: Demand effects                   Full sample Sample excluding crisis years and recessions Full sample Sample excluding crisis years and recessions 
GDP growth 0.157 0.223 -0.087 -0.245 
 (1.14) (0.84) (-1.14) (-0.94) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1687 237 1687 237 
R2 0.231 0.565 0.624 0.778 
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Table 6 
Long-run effects: Evolution of banking competition over time in response to government interventions 
This table presents difference-in-difference regressions for the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on the evolution of banking competition over time, measured by the Lerner index and by 
the net interest margin. To establish the long-run effects of government interventions, we measure competition at t+1 in Panel A and B, at t+3 in Panel C and D, and at t+5 in Panel E and F. The control variables (not shown for brevity) are 
an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, 
a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit % of GDP), the ratio of loan 
impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of 
government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Lerner index (measured at t+1) Panel B: Net interest margin (measured at t+1) 
Blanket guarantee -0.027    0.002    
 
(-0.99)    (0.06)    
Liquidity support  -0.034*    -0.022   
 
 (-1.90)    (-1.34)   
Recapitalizations   -0.043**    -0.025  
 
  (-2.31)    (-1.55)  
Nationalizations    -0.005    -0.040* 
 
   (-0.26)    (-1.80) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
R2 0.245 0.247 0.248 0.245 0.651 0.653 0.653 0.655 
Number of interventions 9 31 28 23 9 31 28 23 
Panel C: Lerner index (measured at t+3) Panel D: Net interest margin (measured at t+3) 
Blanket guarantee -0.058**    0.017    
 
(-2.19)    (0.44)    
Liquidity support  -0.045**    0.002   
 
 (-2.18)    (0.13)   
Recapitalizations   -0.073***    -0.022  
 
  (-3.68)    (-1.14)  
Nationalizations    -0.067***    -0.022 
 
   (-2.91)    (-0.92) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 
R2 0.259 0.261 0.265 0.263 0.680 0.680 0.681 0.681 
Number of interventions 4 24 20 15 4 24 20 15 
Panel E: Lerner index (measured at t+5) Panel F: Net interest margin (measured at t+5) 
Blanket guarantee -0.088    -0.040***    
 
(-1.57)    (-2.96)    
Liquidity support  -0.011    -0.008   
 
 (-0.30)    (-0.61)   
Recapitalizations   -0.017    -0.037**  
 
  (-0.46)    (-2.04)  
Nationalizations    -0.066**    -0.039** 
 
   (-2.38)    (-1.98) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1063 1063 1063 1063 1063 1063 1063 1063 
R2 0.310 0.307 0.308 0.312 0.691 0.690 0.693 0.692 
Number of interventions 3 23 19 14 3 23 19 14 
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Table 7 
Instrumental variable regressions: Effects of government interventions on banking competition 
We present two-stage least squares regressions of the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on Lerner indices and net 
interest margins. Panel A shows the results from the second stage, and Panel B shows the first stage. The first stage regressions use linear probability models. We use 
the same set of instruments for all four government interventions. We use information about the electoral cycle and the political environment. The election year dummy 
takes on the value one if a parliamentary election takes place in the corresponding year, and we additionally use the time since the last election (in years). Further, we 
use a dummy that takes on the value of one if the largest government party has a right-wing orientation, and country population (in logs). Also, we use instruments that 
provide information about the institutional environment: an index that provides information about the prompt corrective power (ranging from 0 to 6) of the regulatory 
agency in charge of supervising banks. The set of instruments is further complemented by information about the number of bank supervisors with more than 10 years of 
experience, and data about the budget (in Million USD) of the supervisory agency. We also rely on a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a neighbouring 
country with contiguous borders to the country we focus on experienced a banking crisis, and we include a dummy for EU membership. The latter two variables are 
interacted to consider fears of contagion in Europe. To consider the opacity of bank balance sheets, we use data about securities holdings. Specifically, securities 
holdings are captured by the ratio of AFS (available for sale) securities to total securities, and HTM (held to maturity) securities to total securities. All regressions 
include the control variables discussed in the notes to Table 3 (not shown). We present a Hansen test for the exclusion restrictions to test the null that the instruments are 
valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. An F-Test for the joint significance of the 
excluded instruments is also reported, and we also show Kleibergen-Paap’s F-Test for weak identification. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak. At the 
bottom of the table, we present the critical values of the Stock and Yogo (2005) F-Statistics for a size bias of 10% relative to OLS.  Country and year dummies 
included. Standard errors clustered on the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Instrumental variable estimator 2nd stage 
Dependent variable Lerner index Net interest margin 
Government interventions         
Blanket guarantee -0.022    -0.040 
   
 
(-0.44)    (-1.24) 
   
Liquidity support  -0.102*   
 
-0.0803** 
  
 
 (-1.79)   
 
(-2.42) 
  
Recapitalizations   -0.0974*  
  
-0.102*** 
 
 
  (-1.71)  
  
(-2.78) 
 
Nationalizations    -0.0579 
   
-0.0955** 
 
   (-1.07) 
   
(-2.25) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 929 929 929 929 929 929 929 929 
R2 0.065 0.040 0.047 0.050 0.289 0.183 0.168 0.197 
Hansen J-Statistic 10.35 7.637 9.021 8.983 21.03 16.19 14.77 19.43 
Hansen p-value 0.499 0.745 0.620 0.623 0.0330 0.134 0.193 0.0537 
Panel B: Instrumental variable estimator 1st stage 
Dependent variable Blanket guarantees Liquidity support Recapitalizations Nationalizations 
Instruments     
Election year  -0.029* -0.060*** -0.053*** -0.030 
 
(-1.77) (-3.11) (-2.68) (-1.67) 
Time since last election (years) -0.011* -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.015** 
 
(-1.83) (-4.15) (-3.28) (-2.03) 
Government party with right-wing orientation -0.019 -0.007 -0.004 -0.046** 
 
(-1.04) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-2.14) 
Population (log) 0.059 -0.726** -1.103*** -1.009*** 
 
(0.27) (-2.07) (-3.15) (-2.83) 
Prompt corrective power 0.008* 0.000 0.005 0.008 
 
(1.92) (0.02) (0.71) (1.25) 
Bank supervisors > 10 years of  experience -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 
(-1.02) (0.79) (0.65) (-1.63) 
Budget for supervision -0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(-1.09) (3.64) (3.52) (2.96) 
EU member country -0.052** -0.110** -0.142*** -0.129*** 
 
(-2.07) (-2.09) (-2.77) (-2.99) 
Contiguous country with crisis -0.000 -0.030 -0.009 -0.002 
 
(-0.01) (-0.88) (-0.25) (-0.05) 
EU member country × Contiguous country with crisis -0.000 0.165** 0.006 0.080 
 
(-0.00) (2.08) (0.11) (1.08) 
AFS securities/Total securities -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-3.61) (-1.59) (-2.66) (-2.99) 
HTM securities/Total securities 0.042*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 
 
(6.59) (3.67) (3.81) (4.78) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 929 929 929 929 
R2 0.328 0.513 0.496 0.428 
Number of interventions 6 22 20 15 
First stage F-Test (instruments) 21.18 16.35 14.66 18.66 
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification F-Statistic 21.20 16.37 14.68 18.68 
Stock and Yogo (2005) maximal IV relative bias 10 %  11.52 11.52 11.52 11.52 
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Table 8 
Heckman selection models: Effects of government interventions on banking competition 
This table presents two-step Heckman selection models that evaluate in the first step the occurrence of a banking crisis (or zero otherwise) and establish in the second step 
the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on competition, measured by the Lerner index in Panel A, and by the net interest 
margin in Panel B. As identifying covariates that determine the occurrence of banking crises, we use the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves to evaluate a country’s propensity 
to suffer sudden capital outflows, and real credit growth. Since the first stage for the occurrence of a banking crisis is identical across the four regressions for the effects of 
government interventions, we only report it once per panel. The vector of control variables (not shown for brevity) that enters both the first and the second stage consists 
of an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, 
a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system 
is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a 
dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy 
for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Panel A: Lerner index Panel B: Net interest margin 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
Dependent variable Banking crisis Competition (Lerner index) Banking crisis Competition (Net interest margin) 
M2/Foreign reserves 0.014***     0.014***     
 (3.30)     (3.30)     
Real credit growth (t-1) 2.517***     2.517***     
 (4.39)     (4.39)     
Blanket guarantee  -11.274***     -9.708***    
  (-2.87)     (-11.59)    
Liquidity support   -0.410**     -0.414***   
   (-2.31)     (-10.95)   
Recapitalizations    -8.505**     -8.578***  
    (2.31)     (-10.95)  
Nationalizations     -0.192     -0.131*** 
     (-1.63)     (-5.81) 
Inverse Mills ratio  0.014 0.014 0.014 0.016  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.71)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.34) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 1673 
Number of interventions n/a 11 34 32 25 n/a 11 34 32 25 
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Table 9 
Extensions: Effects of government interventions on zombie banks 
This table investigates the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on the presence of zombie banks, measured by the deposit and loan market share of zombie banks. The table presents tests for a 
measure of zombie banks based on book values of capital and of market values of capital. Our definition of zombie banks based on book values considers a bank to be a zombie bank if it has a negative tangible capital ratio. Tangible capital equals 
common equity minus intangible assets. Intangible assets comprise good will, other intangibles, and deferred tax assets. We define a bank as a zombie bank based on market values if the market value of common equity and preferred shares is 
below the value of liabilities. The sample using market based measures of zombie banks is substantially reduced because only 2,138 banks of the 21,988 banks in the sample are publicly listed. Panel A presents regressions where the deposit 
market share is the dependent variable, and Panel B presents such regressions for the effect on zombie banks’ loan market shares. Panel C and D replicate these regressions but constrain the sample to countries that experienced a banking crisis. 
Panel E and Panel F show how the frequency of government interventions in a country correlates with the evolution of the market shares of zombie banks in deposit and loan markets, respectively. Panel G presents the change in the competition 
measures per quartile and the corresponding proportion of zombie banks’ market shares in deposit markets, and Panel H shows these analyses for loan markets. All regressions include the control variables (not shown) discussed in the notes to 
Table 3. Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Deposit market share of zombie banks (Full sample) Panel B: Loan market share of zombie banks (Full sample) 
Zombie bank measure based on Book value  Market value  Book value of capital Market value of capital 
Blanket guarantee -0.004    0.032    -0.005    -0.028    
 
(-0.15)    (0.29)    (-0.19)    (-0.25)    
Liquidity support  0.022    0.102    0.028    0.099   
 
 (1.38)    (1.35)    (1.45)    (1.38)   
Recapitalizations   0.021    0.115    0.027    0.106  
 
  (1.26)    (1.49)    (1.37)    (1.41)  
Nationalizations    0.012    0.120    0.014    0.146 
 
   (0.70)    (1.27)    (0.73)    (1.62) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1528 1528 1528 1528 257 257 257 257 1528 1528 1528 1528 257 257 257 257 
R2 0.249 0.252 0.251 0.250 0.828 0.807 0.808 0.807 0.244 0.247 0.247 0.245 0.827 0.805 0.806 0.809 
Number of interventions 9 30 28 23 3 14 12 9 9 30 28 23 3 14 12 9 
Panel C: Deposit market share of zombie banks  (Crisis countries only) Panel D: Loan market share of zombie banks  (Crisis countries only) 
Zombie bank measure based on Book value  Market value  Book value of capital Market value of capital 
Blanket guarantee -0.001    0.072    -0.004    0.008    
 
(-0.03)    (0.84)    (-0.13)    (0.09)    
Liquidity support  0.035**    0.177    0.038*    0.159   
 
 (2.10)    (1.67)    (1.84)    (1.59)   
Recapitalizations   0.028*    0.174*    0.034*    0.150  
 
  (1.94)    (1.83)    (1.79)    (1.66)  
Nationalizations    0.008    0.151    0.007    0.172* 
 
   (0.60)    (1.51)    (0.44)    (1.82) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 479 479 479 479 135 135 135 135 479 479 479 479 135 135 135 135 
R2 0.407 0.414 0.412 0.408 0.853 0.806 0.807 0.801 0.399 0.406 0.405 0.399 0.821 0.773 0.772 0.777 
Number of interventions 9 30 28 23 3 14 12 9 9 30 28 23 3 14 12 9 
Panel E: Frequency of interventions and the deposit market share of zombie banks Panel F: Frequency of interventions and the loan market share of zombie banks 
Zombie bank measure based on  Book value Market value  Book value Market value  
1 0.021 0.032 0.020 0.030 
2 0.067 0.045 0.089 0.041 
3 0.096 0.048 0.104 0.046 
4 0.166 0.048 0.164 0.038 
Panel G: Magnitude of change in competition and deposit market share of zombie banks  Panel H: Magnitude of change in competition and loan market share of zombie banks  
∆Lerner index ∆Net interest margin Lerner index Net interest margin Lerner index Net interest margin 
Zombie bank measure based on  Book value Market 
value 
Book value Market value Book value Market value Book value Market value  
25th -0.133 -0.045 0.121 0.047 0.153 0.047 0.129 0.041 0.166 0.044 
50th -0.026 -0.002 0.155 0.043 0.083 0.047 0.164 0.043 0.087 0.044 
75th 0.007  0.001 0.080 0.049 0.096 0.044 0.076 0.045 0.095 0.043 
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Table 10 
Pricing effects: Deposit and loan rates and government interventions 
The table presents difference-in-difference regressions of the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on average deposit rates in Panel A, and on average loan rates in 
Panel B. Panel C and D replicate these tests but omit years where zombie banks (based on book values of bank equity) are present, and Panel E and F constrain the sample to countries where zombie banks (based on 
book values of equity) are present at least during one year. In all regressions, we include the following control variables (not shown): an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system 
concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in as % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges 
to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of 
government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Panel A: Deposit rates (Full sample)     Panel B: Loan rates (Full sample) 
Blanket guarantee -0.088    -0.053    
 
(-1.66)    (-1.53)    
Liquidity support  -0.048**    -0.051**   
 
 (-2.32)    (-2.19)   
Recapitalizations   -0.041*    -0.049**  
 
  (-1.78)    (-2.08)  
Nationalizations    -0.057**    -0.067** 
 
   (-2.29)    (-2.51) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations          1687  1687 1687 1687 1687          1687         1687 1687 
R2 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916 0.916         0.917         0.917 0.917 
Number of interventions           11   34 32 26 11        34         32 26 
Panel C: Deposit rates (Years with zombie bank presence omitted) Panel D: Loan rates (Years with zombie bank presence omitted) 
Blanket guarantee -0.053    -0.040    
 
(-1.50)    (-1.24)    
Liquidity support  -0.033*    -0.042*   
 
 (-1.84)    (-1.89)   
Recapitalizations   -0.022    -0.031  
 
  (-1.25)    (-1.62)  
Nationalizations    -0.039*    -0.045* 
 
   (-1.90)    (-1.73) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 1463 
R2 0.921 0.921 0.921 0.921 0.922 0.922 0.922 0.922 
Number of interventions 7 22 21 18 7 22 21 18 
Panel E: Deposit rates (Countries with at least one year of zombie banks) Panel F: Loan rates (Countries with at least one year of zombie banks) 
Blanket guarantee -0.102*    -0.054    
 
(-1.70)    (-1.37)    
Liquidity support  -0.054**    -0.056**   
 
 (-2.25)    (-2.34)   
Recapitalizations   -0.060**    -0.067**  
 
  (-2.17)    (-2.41)  
Nationalizations    -0.072**    -0.086*** 
 
   (-2.11)    (-2.81) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 874 874 874 874 874          874           874 874 
R2 0.945 0.944 0.945 0.945 0.931          0.932                         0.933                0.934 
Number of interventions 10 24 22 17 10          24         22 17 
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Table 11 
Pricing effects: Alternative explanations  
The table presents tests to address alternative explanations for the pricing effects shown in Table 10. Panel A shows t-test for differences in means in deposits and money market funding three years prior to and three 
years following the announcement of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations to establish whether inflows of funds differ for these sub-periods. Panel B runs the difference-in-
difference regressions for deposit and loan rates as shown in Table 10 but we now omit countries in which deposit insurance coverage levels increased between 2007 and 2010. In Panel C, we present regressions with 
the setup identical to those presented in Table 10, except for the fact that we exclude country-year observations where the government owns a large proportion of the banking system, defined as government ownership 
exceeding the 75th percentile of the government ownership variable. The control variables in Panel B and Panel C are an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking 
system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes 
on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and 
the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1.  
Panel A: Deposit volumes Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalization Nationalization 
 Before After t-test Before After t-test Before After t-test Before After t-test 
Deposits and money market funding 3,299,749 3,503,309 -0.08 1,681,823 1,915,002 -0.30 2,103,197 2,312,124 -0.24 2,308,503 2,527,478 -0.19 
Panel B: Pricing effects  – countries with increases in deposit insurance coverage limit removed 
 Deposit rates Loan rates 
Blanket guarantee 
-0.139*    -0.081*    
 (-1.94)    (-1.69)    
Liquidity support 
 -0.076**    -0.089**   
 
 (-2.22)    (-2.36)   
Recapitalizations 
  -0.060*    -0.076**  
 
  (-1.71)    (-2.14)  
Nationalizations 
   -0.088**    -0.112*** 
 
   (-2.31)    (-2.90) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 1410 
R2 0.916 0.916 0.915 0.916 0.914 0.915 0.915 0.916 
Number of interventions 8 19 20 17 8 19 20 17 
Panel C: Pricing effects – countries with large government ownership of the banking system removed 
 Deposit rates Loan rates 
Blanket guarantee -0.054    -0.062    
 (-1.12)    (-1.07)    
Liquidity support  -0.037    -0.044*   
  (-1.65)    (-1.74)   
Recapitalizations   -0.037    -0.053*  
   (-1.44)    (-1.90)  
Nationalizations    -0.041*    -0.057* 
    (-1.67)    (-1.96) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 1258 
R2 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.924 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 
Number of interventions 5 23 22 15 5 23 22 15 
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Figure 1 
Effects of government interventions on Lerner indices and net interest margins 
Figure 1 illustrates the change in the competition measure for countries that announced blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations and the corresponding change for 
countries in the control group over the same period. The panel on the left hand side uses the Lerner index as a competition measure, and the panel on the right hand side uses the net interest margin as a 
measure of competition. Each subpanel illustrates the effect of the respective government action. Countries with interventions are represented by a triangle, and countries in the control group are 
depicted by a square. All countries whose ISO codes are printed below the zero line experience contractions in Lerner indices and net interest margins. The diagrams sort the countries on the Y-axis 
from the greatest contraction in the competition measure on the left to the largest increase in the competition measure on the right hand side.  
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Figure 2 
Parallel trends: Behavior of competition measures prior to government interventions 
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of annual changes of Lerner indices and net interest margins in the three years prior to the government interventions (blanket guarantees, liquidity support, 
recapitalizations, and nationalizations). Each panel shows the behavior of competition prior to the respective government action. Countries with interventions are represented by a triangle, and 
countries in the control group are depicted by a square. 
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Figure 3 
Long-run effects of government interventions on competition  
Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of Lerner indices and net interest margins following blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations in the long run in the treatment 
countries. The dark bars show competition in the year the government intervention was announced, and the light bars illustrate the evolution during the five subsequent years. For countries that 
experience interventions after 2005, we only observe the competition measures in the remaining years of the sample period.  
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Figure 4 
Evolution of zombie banks 
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of zombie banks in countries that announced blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations. We present the information for the 
announcement year and the 5 years following the announcement. Each panel demonstrates the evolution of zombie banks’ market shares in terms of deposits, depicted by a circle, and in terms of 
loans, depicted by a square. The panels show results based on book values of capital and of market values (common equity and preferred shares) of capital. Using book values, we define zombie 
banks as banks with negative tangible capital ratios. Tangible capital equals common equity minus intangible assets. Intangible assets comprise good will, other intangibles, and deferred tax assets. 
We define a zombie bank based on market values if the value of the bank’s liabilities exceeds the market value of common equity and preferred shares.  
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.1   
Crises and government interventions  
The table provides in Panel A an overview about countries with banking crises, based on the classification in Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013) and information 
from WEO. We also report the government responses to these crises. Countries market with * are borderline crises. In the United States, the † indicates that the 
crisis started in 2007 but only became systemic in 2008 with deployment of government interventions in 2008. Panel B shows the time distribution of the 
government interventions, and Panel C reports on the frequency of government interventions per country.  
Panel A: Overview 
Country (ISO code) Crisis Government interventions 
 
Start End Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalization Nationalization 
Argentina (ARG) 2001 2003 
 
2001 2001 2001 
Austria (AUT) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
Belgium (BEL) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
Bulgaria (BGR) 1996 1997 
 
1996 1996 1996 
China (CHN) 1998 1998 
 
   
Colombia (COL) 1998 2000 
 
1998 1998 1998 
Croatia (HRV) 1998 1999 
 
 1998 1998 
Czech Republic* (CZE) 1996 2000 
 
 1996  
Denmark (DNK) 2008 - 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Dominican Republic (DOM) 2003 2004 
 
2003   
Ecuador (ECU) 1998 2002 1998 1998 1998 1998 
France* (FRA) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Germany (DEU) 2008 - 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Greece* (GRC) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Hungary* (HUN) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Iceland (ISL) 2008 - 
 
   
Indonesia (IDN) 1997 2001 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Ireland (IRL) 2008 - 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Jamaica (JAM) 1996 1998 1996 1996 1996 1996 
Japan (JPN) 1997 2001 1997  1997 1997 
Kazakhstan* (KAZ) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Korea (KOR) 1997 1998 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Latvia (LVA) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
Luxembourg (LUX) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
Malaysia (MYS) 1997 1999 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Mongolia  (MNG) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
Netherlands (NLD) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
Philippines (PHL) 1997 2001 
 
   
Portugal* (PRT) 2008 - 
 
2008  2008 
Russian Federation (RUS) 1998 1998 
 
1998  1998 
Russian Federation* (RUS) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Slovak Republic (SVK) 1998 2002 
 
   
Slovenia* (SVN) 2008 - 
 
2008   
Spain* (ESP) 2008 - 
 
2008   
Sweden* (SWE) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Switzerland* (CHE) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008  
Thailand (THA) 1997 2000 1997 1997 1997 1997 
Turkey (TUR) 2000 2001 2000 2000 2000 2000 
Ukraine (UKR) 1998 1999 
 
1998   
Ukraine (UKR) 2008 - 
 
2008 2008 2008 
United Kingdom (GBR) 2007 - 
 
2007 2007 2007 
United States (USA)† 2007 -  2008 2008 2008 
Uruguay (URY) 2002 2005  2002 2002 2002 
Vietnam (VNM) 1997 1997   2002  
Panel B: Time distribution Government interventions 
Number of countries with crises Blanket guarantee Liquidity support Recapitalization Nationalization 
1996 3  1 2 3 2 
1997 9  5 4 6 5 
1998 13  1 4 3 4 
1999 10  0 0 0 0 
2000 9  1 1 1 1 
2001 7  0 1 1 1 
2002 4  0 1 1 1 
2003 3  0 1 0 0 
2004 1  0 0 0 0 
2005 1  0 0 0 0 
2006 0  0 0 0 0 
2007 2  0 2 2 2 
2008 20  3 18 15 9 
2009 21  0 0 0 0 
2010 21  0 0 0 0 
Panel C: Frequency of interventions Number of government interventions 
Government interventions per country 1 2 3 4 
% of countries with multiple interventions 13.51 24.95 31.89 29.64 
3 
Supplementary Appendix Table A.2 
Bank level evidence for the effect of recapitalizations and nationalizations 
We report panel data models for the effect of recapitalizations and nationalizations on Lerner indices in Panel A and net interest margins on the bank level 
in Panel B using manually collected information on recapitalizations and nationalizations. The information on recapitalizations and nationalizations only 
covers the recent crisis from 2007 onwards. Banks that receive capital injections or are nationalized are matched with observationally similar banks from 
the same country, the same year, and from the same bank type (commercial, savings, or cooperative bank). Additionally, we impose the criterion that the 
banks from the control group are similar in terms of size based on being in the same size quartile of the distribution of total assets to compare banks that 
are equivalent in terms of scope and scale of business activities. If multiple banks serve as a match for a treatment bank, we restrict the number of matches 
to a maximum of 5 banks in the control group. Our control variables are identical to the control variables used in the regressions on the aggregate (i.e., 
country) level. We include an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the 
natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy 
variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on 
domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple 
interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to 
GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). On the bank level, we use the ratio of loan impairment charges to gross loans, 
and total assets (ln) as further control variables. We also include bank and year fixed effects, and run specifications which additionally include an 
interaction term of country fixed effects with year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Since different countries revert to different 
types of bailouts, we use for recapitalizations and nationalizations two different samples. We present the countries that are included in the two different 
samples at the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Panel A: Lerner index Panel B: Net interest margin 
Recapitalization -0.034* -0.033*   -0.052** -0.054**   
 (-1.95) (-1.82)   (-2.03) (-1.99)   
Nationalization    -0.084* -0.104*   0.002 0.001 
   (-1.86) (-1.87)   (0.31) (0.15) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects × Year fixed effects No  Yes No  Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 7023 7023 890 890 7023 7023 890 890 
R2 0.160 0.173 0.172 0.330 0.050 0.050 0.104 0.216 
Number of interventions 589 589 26 26 589 589 26 26 
Countries included 
Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, United 
States 
Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, 
Mongolia, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom 
Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, France, 
Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, United States 
Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, 
Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, 
Mongolia, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom 
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Supplementary Appendix A.3  
Computation of the Lerner index 
The Lerner index is a widely used measure of banking competition. We follow Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2014) for the computation of the index to capture the degree of 
market power of a bank by calculating the divergence between product prices and marginal 
costs of production. The mark-up of output prices over marginal cost is  
kt
ktkt
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           (A.1)  
where pkt denotes output prices of bank k at time t (total revenue, interest and non-interest, 
divided by total assets) and mckt is the marginal cost obtained by differentiating a translog cost 
function with respect to total assets Q. We estimate the following translog cost function  
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where C is total costs (the sum of interest expenses, commission and fee expenses, trading 
expenses, personnel expenses, and other administrative and operating expenses), Q represents 
total assets, Z1 is the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits and money market funding 
(proxy for input price of deposits), Z2 is the ratio of personal expenses to total assets (proxy for 
input price of labor), and Z3 is the ratio of other operating and administrative expenses to total 
assets (proxy for input price of equipment/fixed capital). All these variables enter the 
regression in logs. The term k denotes bank level fixed effects. The cost equation specified 
above includes trend terms τ that capture cost-reducing technological changes over time. The 
estimation of the cost function in (A.2) is undertaken under the restrictions of symmetry and 
linear homogeneity in the price of inputs. Note that the results do not change if these 
constraints are lifted. The Lerner index, L, takes values between 0 and 1, whereby higher values 
indicate more market power (and, hence, less competition). Calculation of the Lerner index is 
based on data for all commercial, savings, and cooperative banks for the years 1996–2010. The 
5 
bank data are obtained from BankScope. In total, 181,830 bank-year observations for 21,988 
banks in 124 countries are used to compute the index.  
Summary statistics 
The table presents the number of observations, means, and standard deviations for the variables used to calculate the Lerner index. All bank level 
data are obtained from BankScope.  
Variable Observations Mean S.D. Min  Max 
Total assets (ln) 181,830 5.716 2.196 -4.900 19.469 
Total costs (ln) 181,830 2.779 2.156 -7.301 16.754 
Interest expenses/Total deposits, money market and short-term funding (ln) 181,830 -3.634 0.800 -11.838 3.399 
Personal expenses/Total assets (ln) 181,830 -4.260 0.579 -11.415 -0.452 
Operating and administrative expenses/Total assets (ln) 181,830 -4.390 0.693 -11.331 0.372 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.4 
Regressions with additional control variables for expansionary monetary policy and increases in public 
debt during crises 
This table presents additional difference-in-difference regressions for the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations on competition, measured by the Lerner index in Panel A, and by the net interest margin in Panel B. The regressions include two 
additional control variables: a variable that measures monetary expansion, defined as the change in the monetary base (M0) between its peak during the 
crisis and its level one year prior to the crisis, expressed in % of GDP, and a variable that captures increases in public debt in % of GDP, measured over [t-
1, t+3], where t is the starting year of the crisis. For the 2007-2009 crises, it is computed as the difference between pre- and post-crisis debt projections. 
The other control variables (not shown for brevity) are an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking 
system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a 
regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level 
of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if 
a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the 
ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard 
errors are clustered on the country level.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Lerner index Panel B: Net interest margin 
Monetary expansion -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.76) (-0.33) (-0.63) (-0.72) (-0.59) (0.09) (-0.43) (-0.59) 
Increase in public debt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.50) (-0.57) (-0.61) (-0.58) (-0.62) (-0.66) (-0.73) (-0.44) 
Blanket guarantee -0.024    -0.013    
 (-0.96)    (-0.52)    
Liquidity support  -0.031*    -0.028*   
  (-1.85)    (-1.84)   
Recapitalizations   -0.038**    -0.034**  
   (-2.11)    (-2.24)  
Nationalizations    0.000    -0.039** 
    (0.01)    (-2.09) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R2 0.242 0.244 0.244 0.242 0.661 0.664 0.665 0.665 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.5 
Effect of government interventions and assisted mergers on banking system concentration  
This table presents difference-in-difference regressions for the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, nationalizations, and, 
importantly, of assisted mergers on concentration in banking systems, measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The key variable of interest is the 
dummy variable that takes on the value of one if a country used assisted mergers to resolve distressed institutions or zero otherwise. The control variables 
(not shown for brevity) are banking system size, measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable 
that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic 
credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, 
GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the 
change of the exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and year dummies 
included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. 
Dependent variable Concentration 
(HHI) 
Concentration 
(HHI) 
Concentration 
(HHI) 
Concentration 
(HHI) 
Assisted merger -0.036 -0.040 -0.043 -0.050 
 (-0.85) (-0.96) (-1.04) (-1.15) 
Blanket guarantee -0.026    
 (-0.52)    
Liquidity support  -0.010   
  (-0.29)   
Recapitalizations   0.012  
   (0.34)  
Nationalizations    0.041 
    (1.05) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R-squared 0.547 0.547 0.547 0.548 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.6 
Additional robustness tests 
We present additional tests. The first test in the first subpanel clusters standard errors by year. The second test in the first subpanel includes an additional control variable which takes on the value of one if a country also set up asset management companies and restructuring agencies which assume distressed bank assets. In the 
second subpanel we account for the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) and the too-many-to-fail (TMTF) effects. We consider the too-big-to-fail effect by removing countries whose HHI lies above the 95
th
 percentile of the distribution of the concentration variable, and we account for the too-many-to-fail effect by excluding countries 
whose total capital ratio is below the 5
th
 percentile of the capital ratio. The third subpanel removes high income economies and emerging markets. The fourth subpanel uses regression weights where we use the inverse of the number of interventions as a weight to assign less importance to countries with multiple interventions. 
The last test additionally includes a dummy variable for the year during the onset of the crisis. All regressions contain the control variables discussed in the notes to Table 3 (not shown). We use the Lerner index in Panel A and the net interest margin in Panel B as dependent variable. Country and year dummies included. 
Standard errors clustered on the country level unless stated otherwise. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Lerner index  Panel B: Net interest margins 
Subpanel: Clustering and additional controls            Clustering of SE by year Controlling for asset management and restructuring 
companies  
Clustering of SE by year Controlling for asset management and restructuring 
companies 
Blanket guarantee -0.025    -0.027    -0.014**    -0.014    
 (-1.04)    (-1.12)    (-2.30)    (-0.56)    
Liquidity support  -0.033**    -0.033*    -0.028    -0.027*   
  (-2.28)    (-1.95)    (-1.60)    (-1.78)   
Recapitalizations   -0.039***    -0.038**    -0.034**    -0.031**  
   (-3.38)    (-2.14)    (-2.64)    (-2.08)  
Nationalizations    -0.001    -0.002    -0.039**    -0.038** 
    (-0.08)    (-0.08)    (-2.55)    (-2.07) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R2 0.242 0.243 0.244 0.241 0.241 0.243 0.244 0.241 0.661 0.663 0.664 0.665 0.664 0.666 0.667 0.668 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 
Subpanel:  TBTF and TMTF Accounting for the too-big-to-fail effect (TBTF) Accounting for the too-many-to-fail effect (TMTF) Accounting for the too-big-to-fail effect (TBTF) Accounting for the too-many-to-fail effect (TMTF) 
Blanket guarantee -0.025    -0.009    -0.015    -0.006    
 (-1.00)    (-0.34)    (-0.60)    (-0.23)    
Liquidity support  -0.035**    -0.028*    -0.029*    -0.027   
  (-2.04)    (-1.81)    (-1.91)    (-1.59)   
Recapitalizations   -0.040**    -0.034**    -0.035**    -0.033*  
   (-2.18)    (-2.18)    (-2.27)    (-1.79)  
Nationalizations    -0.002    -0.039**    -0.040**    0.007 
    (-0.12)    (-2.08)    (-2.17)    (0.38) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 
R2 0.235 0.237 0.237 0.234 0.671 0.674 0.675 0.676 0.655 0.658 0.659 0.660 0.248 0.250 0.250 0.248 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 10 33 31 25 11 34 32 26 10 33 31 25 
Subpanel: Subsamples High income economies excluded Emerging market economies excluded High income economies excluded Emerging market economies excluded 
Blanket guarantee -0.087**    -0.016    -0.032    -0.041***    
 (-2.29)    (-0.46)    (-0.97)    (-3.08)    
Liquidity support  -0.049    -0.042**    -0.047**    -0.033*   
  (-1.51)    (-2.08)    (-2.04)    (-1.95)   
Recapitalizations   -0.061*    -0.044*    -0.048**    -0.048***  
   (-1.89)    (-1.95)    (-2.47)    (-2.63)  
Nationalizations    -0.027    -0.005    -
0.070*** 
   -0.047** 
    (-0.69)    (-0.21)    (-2.67)    (-2.40) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1223 1223 1223 1223 1381 1381 1381 1381 1223 1223 1223 1223 1381 1381 1381 1381 
R2 0.257 0.258 0.259 0.256 0.246 0.249 0.249 0.246 0.672 0.676 0.675 0.678 0.657 0.660 0.663 0.662 
Number of interventions 7 21 20 17 6 24 22 17 7 21 20 17 6 24 22 17 
Subpanel: Weights,accounting for onset of crises Weighted regressions Controlling for onset of crises Weighted regressions Controlling for onset of crises 
Blanket guarantee -0.025    -0.025    -0.024    -0.013    
 (-1.01)    (-1.04)    (-0.97)    (-0.54)    
Liquidity support  -0.030*    -0.033*    -0.028*    -0.030*   
  (-1.88)    (-1.92)    (-1.79)    (-1.94)   
Recapitalizations   -0.042**    -0.039**    -0.040**    -0.034**  
   (-2.28)    (-2.11)    (-2.47)    (-2.22)  
Nationalizations    0.001    -0.001    -0.046**    -0.039** 
    (0.04)    (-0.04)    (-2.31)    (-2.12) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R2 0.247 0.247 0.248 0.247 0.242 0.243 0.244 0.241 0.666 0.667 0.668 0.668 0.661 0.664 0.665 0.665 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.7 
Competition measurement: Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic as dependent variable  
This table presents an additional test that rules out that competition measurement drives our inferences. We use the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistic 
as an alternative competition measure. The explanatory variables in these regressions are identical to the ones used in the analyses shown in Table 3. 
Unlike the Lerner index and the net interest margin, the H-Statistic increases in competition. The H-Statistic measures the effect of revenue elasticities 
with respect to factor input prices and is a measure of contestability. The control variables (not shown for brevity) are an asset-based Herfindahl-
Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy 
that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial 
system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan 
impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP 
per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in 
local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level.  Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Dependent variable H-Statistic H-Statistic H-Statistic H-Statistic 
Blanket guarantee 0.042*    
 (1.79)    
Liquidity support  0.018   
  (0.97)   
Recapitalizations   0.031*  
   (1.79)  
Nationalizations    0.037** 
    (2.08) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,538 1,538 1,538 1,538 
R2 0.836 0.836 0.837 0.837 
Number of interventions 11 33 31 25 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.8 
Initial market conditions and the role of transparency 
Panel A examines initial conditions. We present coefficients from difference-in-difference regressions of the effect of the interactions of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and 
nationalizations with initial conditions of concentration, foreign bank ownership, activity restrictions, entry restrictions, and explicit deposit insurance on competition. Each cell represents a single 
regression. All other coefficients are suppressed to preserve space. All regressions include the control variables discussed in the notes to Table 3. Since the difference-in-difference estimator 
requires a control group for which the initial conditions have to be defined, we use a 1:n matching procedure that matches a country that recorded any one of these government interventions with a 
group of comparable countries based on year and World Bank income category. Panel B tests the effect of transparency by interacting a Transparency index with the four different government 
interventions. We use a Transparency index which consists of a dummy variable that takes on the value one if a compulsory external audit is required and an accounting index that is increasing in 
the quality of bank accounts. Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level. Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: The role of initial conditions     
Subpanel: Lerner index Market structure Contestability Contestability Contestability Moral hazard 
Government intervention interacted 
with  
Concentration 
HHI 
(initial conditions) 
Foreign bank 
ownership  
(initial conditions) 
Activity restrictions 
index  
(initial conditions) 
Entry restrictions index 
(initial conditions) 
Explicit deposit 
insurance 
(initial conditions) 
Blanket guarantee × Column variable -0.327*** 0.115*** -0.004 -0.051*** 0.069 
 (-7.74) (2.92) (-0.38) (-3.34) (0.64) 
Liquidity support × Column variable -0.194*** 0.126** -0.003 -0.024 0.049 
 (-2.75) (2.10) (-0.36) (-1.65) (1.14) 
Recapitalizations × Column variable -0.261*** 0.131** -0.009 -0.030** 0.064 
 (-4.33) (2.09) (-1.22) (-2.09) (1.52) 
Nationalizations × Column variable -0.231** 0.144** -0.000 -0.027* 0.077* 
 (-2.34) (2.07) (-0.01) (-1.76) (1.77) 
Subpanel: Net interest margin      
Blanket guarantee × Column variable -0.061 -0.008 0.030*** 0.009 0.020 
 (-0.75) (-0.18) (3.06) (0.63) (0.52) 
Liquidity support × Column variable -0.043 -0.033 0.012 0.008 0.112*** 
 (-0.71) (-0.70) (1.40) (1.48) (2.82) 
Recapitalizations × Column variable -0.060 -0.023 0.002 0.004 0.122*** 
 (-0.95) (-0.48) (0.16) (0.65) (3.52) 
Nationalizations × Column variable -0.080 -0.039 0.017* 0.005 0.110** 
 (-1.17) (-0.56) (1.77) (1.01) (2.68) 
Panel B: The role of transparency 
Subpanel: Lerner index     Subpanel: Net interest margin   
Transparency index -0.010 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 -0.006 -0.008* -0.007* -0.008* 
 (-1.02) (-1.24) (-1.16) (-1.27) (-1.46) (-1.94) (-1.70) (-1.89) 
Blanket guarantee -0.215    -0.134**    
 (-0.99)    (-2.43)    
Blanket guarantee × Transparency  0.045    0.026**    
 (0.89)    (2.19)    
Liquidity support  -0.175**    -0.135**   
  (-2.15)    (-2.46)   
Liquidity support × Transparency   0.036**    0.028***   
  (2.08)    (2.83)   
Recapitalizations   -0.222**    -0.113*  
   (-2.20)    (-1.84)  
Recapitalizations × Transparency    0.042*    0.023*  
   (1.80)    (1.81)  
Nationalizations    -0.188**    -0.152*** 
    (-2.08)    (-3.16) 
Nationalizations × Transparency     0.044**    0.030*** 
    (2.16)    (3.44) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 
R2 0.320 0.321 0.323 0.322 0.724 0.726 0.725 0.726 
Number of interventions 9 26 25 21 9 26 25 21 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.9  
The role of bank charter values 
This table presents difference-in-difference regressions for the effect of blanket guarantees, liquidity support, recapitalizations, and nationalizations on 
banking competition, measured by the Lerner index in Panel A and the net interest margin in Panel B. These regressions additionally consider the role 
of bank charter values, interacted with the government interventions. We approximate bank charter values by the ratio of current deposits to total 
deposits and real money market and short-term funding. The control variables (not shown for brevity) are  an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the 
value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates whether the country’s financial system is bank-
based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of GDP), the ratio of loan impairment 
charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, inflation, real GDP per capita, 
real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the exchange rate (in local 
currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level.  Robust t-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Lerner index     Panel B: Net interest margin 
Charter value 0.004 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.033 0.026 0.030 0.029 
 (0.14) (0.30) (0.22) (0.14) (1.61) (1.29) (1.42) (1.41) 
Blanket guarantee -0.003    -0.030    
 (-0.07)    (-1.30)    
Blanket guarantee × Charter value  -0.042    -0.016    
 (-0.40)    (-0.46)    
Liquidity support  -0.008    -0.042**   
  (-0.29)    (-2.05)   
Liquidity support × Charter value   -0.061    0.040   
  (-0.98)    (1.22)   
Recapitalizations   -0.020    -0.037**  
   (-0.69)    (-2.07)  
Recapitalizations × Charter value    -0.046    0.008  
   (-0.74)    (0.26)  
Nationalizations    0.016    -0.045** 
    (0.61)    (-2.20) 
Nationalizations × Charter value     -0.029    0.016 
    (-0.47)    (0.52) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 1600 
R2 0.253 0.255 0.255 0.253 0.663 0.665 0.665 0.666 
Number of interventions 10 32 30 24 10 32 30 24 
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Supplementary Appendix Table A.10 
Effects of government interventions on the components of the Lerner index 
 (prices and marginal cost) 
This table presents difference-in-difference regressions with the components of the Lerner index, prices in Panel A and marginal cost in Panel B as dependent 
variables. Marginal costs are obtained by differentiating the Translog cost function shown in Supplementary Appendix A.3. The control variables (not shown 
for brevity) are an asset-based Herfindahl-Hirschman index to capture banking system concentration, banking system size measured by the natural logarithm of 
banking system assets, a dummy that takes on the value of one if assisted mergers took place, a regulatory quality index, a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the country’s financial system is bank-based, an index ranging from 1 to 3 for the level of financial development (based on domestic credit in % of 
GDP), the ratio of loan impairment charges to loans, a dummy that takes on the value of one if a country announced multiple interventions, GDP growth, 
inflation, real GDP per capita, real money market rates (ln) as a proxy for monetary policy, the ratio of government debt to GDP, and the change of the 
exchange rate (in local currency units per USD). Country and year dummies included. Standard errors are clustered on the country level.  Robust t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Panel A: Lerner index components - Prices Panel B: Lerner index components - Marginal cost 
Blanket guarantee -0.027*    -0.025*    
 (-1.72)    (-1.88)    
Liquidity support  -0.017**    -0.014**   
  (-2.39)    (-2.12)   
Recapitalizations   -0.013    -0.013  
   (-1.47)    (-1.49)  
Nationalizations    -0.019**    -0.019** 
    (-2.27)    (-2.55) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 1687 
R2 0.744 0.745 0.743 0.744 0.738 0.738 0.737 0.739 
Number of interventions 11 34 32 26 11 34 32 26 
 
 
 
 
